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Abstract
By 2025 the FAA plans to have fully implemented its NextGen Airspace design.
NextGen takes advantage of modern positioning technologies as well as automation, data
sharing, and display technologies that will allow more efficient use of our ever busier
National Airspace (NAS). A key element of NextGen is the transition from surveillance
RADAR providing aircraft separation and navigation to the use of the GPS and
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B couples the precision of
the GPS with networked ground and airborne receivers to provide precise situational
awareness to pilots and controllers. The result is increased safety, capacity, and access
with reduced reliance on an outdated and costly existing infrastructure. Reliance on the
vulnerable GPS requires a backup system with higher positioning accuracy than those
that are in place today. The USAF 746th Test Squadron at Holloman AFB, in partnership
with Locata Corp., has demonstrated an Ultra High Accuracy Reference System
(UHARS) over the Holloman Range composed of pseudolites (ground based satellites)
transmitting GPS like signals. This study evaluates the suitability of the UHARS when
applied on a national scale to meet Alternate Precision Navigation and Timing (APNT)
requirements. From a systems architecture perspective UHARS is evaluated against
APNT CONOPs stated Operational Improvements and Scenarios. From a signal
architecture perspective the UHARS is evaluated against frequency and bandwidth
constraints, service volume requirements and positioning accuracy determined by
NextGen Airspace aircraft separation criteria.
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PSEUDOLITE ARCHITECTURE AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
FOR THE FAA’S NextGen AIRSPACE

I. Introduction
Background
By 2025 the FAA expects to have implemented many of its Next
Generation (NextGen) improvements to the National Airspace (NAS). NextGen
Airspace boasts improvements to nearly every facet of the NAS, including efficiency,
safety, situational awareness, environmental impact, and cost of service. A key
component of NextGen in 2025 is the transition from legacy navigation systems and
RADAR surveillance to Alternate Precision Navigation and Timing (APNT) and
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) (Federal Aviation
Administration 2012).
Today’s NAS architecture dictates that Air Traffic Control (ATC) determines an
aircraft’s position based on Surveillance RADAR returns. The precision of this method
degrades with increasing range from the RADAR site and is a factor in the minimum
separation provided between aircraft for safety. In a non-RADAR environment aircrew
must report their position as determined from GPS or navigation aids such as VOR and
DME. This is known as procedural separation and it is the least accurate, therefore
requiring the greatest separation between aircraft.
The transition to ADS-B in NextGen architecture is dependent on precise
aircraft reported position rather than surveillance or primary RADAR. GPS is currently
the only navigation source approved for ADS-B with the accuracy required to meet
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NextGen performance objectives. One of the primary objectives of NextGen is to
increase capacity and access to our busiest airports. Precise navigation and reduced
separation in busy airspace (more aircraft flying efficiently through a smaller area) are
the enablers. A secondary objective of dependent surveillance is a reduction in the
required infrastructure and maintenance cost of the current NAS architecture. This
means removing non-essential and aging RADAR sites and navigation aids.
Combined, the plans to reduce separation minimums and eliminate existing
infrastructure place a heavy burden on the GPS service. The safety of life concern and
demand for high availability with few outages will require a backup to the vulnerable
GPS. This secondary navigation source is known as APNT.
The APNT CONOPS is our primary source of information regarding the
necessary capabilities and functions of any APNT solution. This CONOPS outlines
multiple scenarios in which degraded or denied GPS will have significant impact on the
safety, efficiency, and capacity of NextGen airspace in 2025. At best, user workload is
increased and fuel or time savings from efficient routings is lost. At worst, reduced
separation minimums that were sufficient in the presence of GPS would place large
numbers of aircraft dangerously close to one another around dozens of the nation’s
busiest airports. The ideal form of APNT would provide a seamless transition from
GPS with no degradation in performance and unnoticed by the users.
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Figure 1: APNT Architecture Alternatives
Three forms of APNT are being considered by the FAA and are depicted in
Figure 1. The first is an improvement of existing Distance Measuring Equipment
(DME). With DME, range from a known ground site is determined by timing a round
trip signal sent from an aircraft to the ground site and back. An “interrogation” is sent
from the aircraft at a specific frequency in the form a pulse-pair. If a ground site on the
same frequency receives the pulse-pair it responds in kind after a specified delay. The
round trip time, plus the delay, is computed by the aircraft and converted to range.
Given a range to two sites, and some knowledge of altitude, heading and airspeed, a
“DME-DME” navigation system can determine an aircraft’s position. DME ground
sites have a limited capacity and can become saturated in busy airspace. Current DME
performance would not provide the accuracy or availability required by the APNT
CONOPs.
The second form of APNT being considered is Multi-Lateration (MLAT). An
aircraft’s position is determined again by measuring distances to multiple ground sites
but the computation is done on the ground. Ranging methods vary but each method
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results in a unique range known to each ground site. The range to each site is combined
over a data network and used to compute a position in space. The aircraft’s position is
then sent via wireless data link to the aircraft. MLAT already exists on the ground at
busy airports to monitor busy traffic on ramps, taxiways, and runways (FAA 2007).
One downside of MLAT is that information about range to an aircraft must be
compared by multiple ground MLAT sites. This requires network infrastructure and
could theoretically be saturated. A second downside is the increased risk to integrity as
data passes through the network and position is transmitted to the aircraft.
The third form of APNT being considered is a pseudolite architecture.
Pseudo-satellites perform functions similar to those of Satellites of the GPS but exist on
the ground as fixed transmitters. The candidate technology that will be evaluated in
this thesis, known as Locata, was developed on modified GPS hardware and resembles
GPS signal architecture in several ways. Each pseudolite transmits a unique signal that
is synchronized to a common clock. Avionics on the aircraft compare the time of
reception of a signal to the time of transmission to compute range to the pseudolite.
Computed range to multiple pseudolites is used to determine position. Capacity of a
pseudolite architecture is unlimited. Integrity of the computed position is a composite
of each of the signals used for the calculation. Like GPS, a broken or false signal could
be identified by the user autonomously, although at a cost. A significant challenge of
pseudolites is synchronization of their clocks on a continental scale. Methods of
synchronization will be explored further in this thesis.
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The 746th Test Squadron at Holloman Air Force Base has successfully
demonstrated a pseudolite network known as the Ultra High Accuracy Reference
System (UHARS) to accuracies that far exceed APNT requirements. The purpose of
the UHARS is to provide a reference system in the absence of GPS on the White Sands
Missile Range accurate to 10 cm (Craig 2011). It is based on the local area pseudolite
technology known as Locata. Locata signals are very similar to GPS signals in many
regards. Changes have been made to transmitted power levels, Time Domain Multiple
Access (TDMA) schemes, and almanac information encoded in the signals to account
for the terrestrial environment of the pseudolites compared to their GPS counterparts.
Locata is billed as an alternative to GPS in environments that would deny the use of
GPS such as inside warehouses or in deep urban canyons and open pit mines. The
UHARS demonstration is an adaptation of Locata that allows signal tracking up to 30
nautical miles. In October 2011 ten pseudolites like the one depicted in Figure 2 were
deployed over 800 square miles of the White Sands Range as a demonstration. The
operational UHARS will cover more than 2500 sq. miles (Craig 2011).
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Figure 2: UHARS Pseudolite at White Sands
The FAA APNT team has stated their desire to determine NextGen’s APNT
source by 2015. This study piece of the larger effort to determine what form of APNT
will best serve our needs of 2025 and beyond.
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Problem Statement
How can the UHARS model of Locata pseudolite technology be applied to meet
the APNT problem of NextGen 2025?
The 746th Test Squadron and Locata Corporation have together demonstrated
that the UHARS can meet or exceed APNT accuracy requirements over a small area
with good line-of-sight topography between pseudolites. The APNT CONOPS
demands a positioning source that is available over all of the Continental United States,
(CONUS) at altitudes and through corridors used to access the nation’s busiest 135
airports.
Methodology and Research Objective
This thesis will consider the application of pseudolites to the APNT problem in
two distinct phases. The first phase will develop Systems Engineering architecture as a
baseline that is modeled after the DoD Architecture Framework (DoD CIO 2010). The
architecture will describe a pseudolite navigation system in the context of the FAAs
approved APNT CONOPs. The focus of this architecture will be primarily on
pseudolites, other organizations have been tasked with developing architecture for other
alternatives such as DME/DME and MLAT techniques. Viewpoints will be generated
beginning with high level operational views that are consistent with existing
documentation of NextGen 2025. These views will, for the most part, be technology
agnostic and could describe any pseudolite system in the context of the APNT
CONOPS. The primary objective of the operational viewpoints is to connect the
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scenarios and operational improvements outlined in the APNT CONOPS with the
theoretical capabilities of a pseudolite architecture.
Systems views will then be developed that are more specific to the UHARS.
Systems views will illustrate connectivity between nodes of the UHARS network and
ultimately highlight the greatest challenge posed by a nationwide pseudolite network
based off of UHARS. The systems views will show the UHARS as it has been
implemented at Holloman AFB and then be modified to show a potential variation of
the UHARS that could satisfy the APNT need.
An enterprise architecture exists for As-Is and To-Be NextGen airspace in an
incomplete form.

The architecture focuses on how NextGen will function in the

presence of GPS. This study will highlight the strengths and shortcomings of a
pseudolite solution in the context of the NextGen framework.
The second part of this thesis is a model of the UHARS signal that is designed
to predict performance of a pseudolite system of varied configurations. The model
incorporates many characteristics of the UHARS signal as variables, applies basic
models of signal propagation, hardware attenuation, and receiver performance to
predict the positioning accuracy of the signal. The model also considers signals that
will potentially share the same band as the new APNT signal. These signals reside in a
protected band from 960 MHz to 1215 MHz known as the Airborne Radio Navigation
Service (ARNS). Each “resident” of the ARNS has its own published values of
acceptable interference that must be considered. Three primary characteristics of any
signal become apparent. The effective range of the signal will determine the number of
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pseudolites required to cover the NAS and 135 busy airports. The coded message
within the signal will affect its theoretical accuracy and precision. The combination of
power and signal frequency and encoding will affect its influence on (and from) radios
in nearby channels.
The objective of this signal model is to bound the trade space between
positioning performance of the system, the potential cost of infrastructure required for
nationwide coverage, and its ability to coexist with existing radio navigation systems.
Investigative Questions
To meet the research objectives stated above, the following questions will be
used as guidelines in the production of architectural viewpoints and building a model of
pseudolite APNT.
o
o

o
o
o

o

o

What measures of performance will adequately define any APNT system
within the context of NextGen2025?
What is the cost of increasing coverage within the continental US (CONUS) or
providing an over-determined solution for integrity in terms of the number of
pseudolites required?
How does the service volume of a pseudolite affect the number of pseudolites
required to cover all airspace requiring APNT?
How will a pseudolite APNT signal operate within the ARNS band?
Can the UHARS meet the operational improvements of NextGen and scenario
based CONOPS of APNT, what levels of performance will be required in any
given airspace?
What are the shortfalls of the UHARS signal, pseudolite architecture, and
APNT performance requirements when applied to NextGen 2025 operational
improvements?
What is an acceptable means of clock synchronization?
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Assumptions, Limitations and Scope
This thesis is written in the context of NextGen 2025 improvements to the NAS.
The focus is on pseudolite technology applied to the need for APNT. The APNT
CONOPs is the primary reference that defines the mission of APNT (Federal Aviation
Administration 2012). The pseudolite architecture proposed reflects the minimum
“threshold” performance stated by the FAAs APNT team, as well as the desired level of
performance.
This thesis will not attempt to model the cost of any proposed pseudolite APNT
solution. It will provide a foundation upon which cost estimates could be developed in
the future. Answers to questions such as: ‘How many pseudolites will be required?’
and ‘What timing infrastructure will be needed?’, will be discussed in this thesis.
This thesis will not evaluate the performance of a pseudolite signal outside of
US airspace. However, existing navigation sources in the ARNS band are protected by
international treaty and any APNT solution would be equipped on aircraft that fly
internationally. Logically then, future research should include suitability in oceanic or
foreign airspace.
Key assumptions are as follows:


Aircraft operating in 2025 controlled airspace will be required to operate
ADS-B equipment coupled to a suitable navigation source.



GPS outages may be caused by unexpected system failures, planned or
predictable interference, or by malicious jamming and spoofing activity.
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At a minimum, APNT must provide means of safe navigation to a point
clear of GPS outage or to an instrument landing system (ILS) final
approach fix at one of the nation’s 65 busiest airports.

In the development of the UHARS signal model many assumptions were made
about the performance of receivers, masks and filters, and the stated properties of other
ARNS navigation signals. Signal propagation, range accuracy, and other error models
are only rudimentary models. Therefore, the signal model is limited to first order
analysis of pseudolites and the UHARS as an APNT solution. Future research should
include high fidelity simulation or actual hardware implantation of a proposed APNT
signal.
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II. Literature Review
The following review covers those documents and topics that were key to this
thesis. They each provide an important volume of background information required to
develop the architecture and signal models that follow. Minor documents not covered
in this section are referenced throughout the text.
Concept of Operations
The United States’ air transportation system is under increasing stress from user
demands. While accommodating increasing traffic it must also accommodate
increasing environmental and security concerns. The current system is probably not
capable of meeting our demands beyond 2025. In response the Joint Planning and
Development Office has been tasked with defining the CONOPS for the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) (Joint Planning and Development
Office 2010).
NextGen boasts several improvements over today’s air transportation system.
These improvements can be divided into services such as Air Traffic Management,
Airport Operations, Net-Centric Infrastructure, and Safety Management.
Communications and automation will play a big role in NextGen architecture, allowing
service providers and customers to share information and respond accordingly, known
as Shared Situational Awareness (SSA).
Of note, NextGen must accommodate a predicted 100% increase in air traffic by
2025. While increasing capacity, there will always be a desire to reduce delays and
interruptions, reduce operator workload, decrease environmental impact, and improve
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safety. NextGen addresses all of these issues by relying on modern enabling
technologies that did not exist when the present air transportation system was designed.
Increasing capacity, improving safety and efficiency, and reducing interruptions means
squeezing more aircraft into the same airspace; this means higher precision means of
navigation and surveillance. The key enabling technology to increase traffic density
was the Global Positioning System, other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
and ground systems collectively known as Precision Navigation and Timing (PNT).
A transition to PNT and SSA will not only provide the benefits listed above but
allow the FAA to eliminate costly legacy navigation and surveillance systems. PNT
alone allows aircraft operators to determine their position in time and space more
precisely than with traditional VOR and DME equipment. Through SSA, controllers
on the ground are able to use PNT to support more precise surveillance of air traffic,
thereby reducing traffic separation minimums and optimizing traffic flows. This is
known as dependent surveillance (surveillance depends upon aircraft reported position)
and leads us to a common failure mode that had not existed in the past. When PNT is
lost, ATC surveillance capability is lost as well. Current surveillance RADAR
performance is not able to support NextGen standards.
The APNT CONOPS provides a brief background of NextGen improvements
and places the need for APNT into context. The CONOPS describes the bona fide need
for an alternate positioning source, builds two scenarios in which users of NextGen
would require an APNT source, and then outlines the impacts of GPS interference on
the NAS without an APNT source (Federal Aviation Administration 2012).
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Because air transportation navigation and surveillance are “safety-of-life”
operations, the reliance of both on PNT requires an alternate system be in place.
National Policy directives mandate that the Department of Transportation and
Department of Homeland Security work together to mitigate the threats posed to
national infrastructure that could cause harm to citizens or disrupt economies as well as
provide a backup to the GPS in case of a disruption (Federal Aviation Administration
2012). As stated above, current surveillance and navigation infrastructure could not
serve as a backup because it lacks the precision. As transition to NextGen progresses
and reliance on PNT becomes greater the potential cost of a GPS outage grows. With a
backup in place, the value of GPS as a terrorist target would also be diminished.
Accordingly, four pillars of APNT are outlined in the APNT CONOPS:





Safe recovery (landing) of aircraft flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions
(IMC) under Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) operations
Strategic modification of flight trajectories to avoid areas of interference and
manage demand within the interference area
Continued dispatch of air carrier operations to deny an economic target for an
intentional jammer
Flight operations continue without a significant increase in workload for either the
pilot or the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) during an interference event.

The two scenarios developed in the APNT CONOPS describe a commercial
carrier and a general aviation aircraft conducting long range flights into Bozeman, MT
and Miami, FL. At each stage of flight, from pre-flight planning to post-flight shut
down at the terminal, the operational impacts of a GPS outage in the absence of an
APNT source are highlighted. The impacts of a GPS outage and the response by ATC
and operators will vary depending on the nature of the outage. Many forms of GPS
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outage or interference are described and can be categorized by a few variables. Is the
outage planned, can it be predicted, or is it unpredictable? Is the outage localized or
wide spread? Is the outage intermittent or continuous? Realistic GPS interference
scenarios are presented in two forms. “Personal privacy devices” are localized,
intermittent, and unpredictable. These are low powered noise jammers often used to
disable tracking devices on vehicles. Intentional GPS jamming for National Security
can be widespread but is planned and predictable. Intentional interference with GPS
by the DOD is often necessary for the development of advanced navigation
technologies.
Finally, the APNT CONOPS references positioning performance standards for
various types of airspace and phases of flight and defines “APNT Zones” that would be
used to define required performance levels of any APNT signal within each Zone. This
thesis will reduce the performance criteria to the basic performance standards of APNT
and identify which Operational Improvements will be met by a pseudolite APNT
system.
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Locata Pseudolites
Locata technology provides the basis for the pseudolite model being studied in
this thesis. Locata was developed for commercial use by an Australian company to
provide a PNT source in environments that would preclude the use of GPS. Such
environments include open pit mining, urban canyons, warehouses, or in other
buildings with poor GPS signal. To simplify the development process, the Locata
positioning signal was modeled after the GPS and then modified to meet the unique
requirements of a terrestrial positioning system (Locata Corporation 2011).
A LocataNet is built from multiple ground based pseudolites, each referred to as
LocataLites, which make up the Terestrial Segment (TS), and a limitless number of
user receivers known as the User Segment (US). There is no distinct control segment
as with the GPS. Establishing the TS involves surveying each LocataLite position.
Because the LocataLites are in a fixed position no control segment is required to
monitor the position of the LocataLites. LocataLites autonomously arrange themselves
into the appropriate network patterns based on available line-of-site geometry over the
network area. This line-of-site link between LocataLites became one of its primary
limitations when applied to nationwide APNT.
As a pseudolite positioning system, Locata uses multiple ranging signals from
known points to determine a user’s position in space. Most readers will be at least
partly familiar with this method of positioning used by the GPS. The primary
difference between GPS, or other global navigation satellite system (GNSS), and
Locata is that the ranging signals are sent from ground based “pseudo satellites” rather
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than space based satellites. The timing of the ranging signals from each pseudolite is
predefined. Through the use of pseudorandom spreading codes, much like the GPS,
this time of transmission is compared to the time of reception at the user’s receiver to
determine the distance the signal has traveled. This process does not require a precise
clock in the user’s receiver but does require coordinated time references at each of the
pseudolites. GPS takes advantage of precise clocks and correction updates from the
GPS control segment. LocataNets use a proprietary process known as TimeLoc.
TimeLoc is a method of referencing each LocataLite’s internal clock to a master
LocataLite. The master LocataLite’s time reference may be its own internal clock, or
more precise references derived externally. This eliminates the need to include clock
correction information in the ephemeris data of the signal. To synchronize a slave to
the master, the slave LocataLite “listens” to its own transmitted signal and matches it,
in phase, to the received signal from the master LocataLite. A single “hop” is said to be
accurate to 6 cycles, 2 nano-seconds, or 60 centimeters (Locata Corporation 2011).
TimeLoc can then be cascaded such that a slave LocataLite is a master to a third
LocataLite beyond line-of-site from the original master. This method of time
synchronization is precise and low cost but requires a clear line-of-site from one
LocataLite to another.
Satellites in the GPS constellation are over 20,000km away, with a variation of
only a few thousand kilometers. Terrestrial pseudolites of LocataNets may range from
tens of kilometers to only a few meters. The resulting variation in signal strength can
easily exceed the dynamic range of Locata receivers derived from the pseudorandom
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spreading codes’ code division multiple access (CDMA). The solution is to include a
TDMA scheme, on top of the CDMA, into the Locata signal. Each LocataLite is
assigned a position on a sub-net that allows it to broadcast only 100msec of each
second. This prevents interference between LocataLites that may be near and far. The
TDMA scheme will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4.
To allow an elegant combination of GPS and Locata hardware, Locata designers
built upon the GPS frequency plan. The pseudorandom codes of each LocataLite are
the same codes used by GPS, although “chipped” at a ten-times faster rate to improve
ranging precision and spread the signal over a wider bandwidth. The base oscillator
frequency is the same, although Locata transmits in the license-free 2.4GHz ISM band.
Modifications in this thesis will attempt to keep these similarities intact.
To mitigate multi-path interference, and enable “wide-lane” carrier phase
techniques, each LocataLite transmits two similar signals on different frequencies
(Locata Corporation 2011). Antenna spatial diversity can also be implemented at a
LocataLite to mitigate multi-path. Transmission of two signals from two physically
separated antennas requires four unique signals from each LocataLite. These
techniques of multipath mitigation are important in the typical Locata installation
indoors, in open mines, and in urban areas. These crowded spaces offer many
opportunities for signals to reflect off of objects.
Ultra High Accuracy Reference System
The Air Force’s 746th Test Squadron, based at Holloman AFB, NM, is the
Department of Defense’s lead test organization for GPS user equipment and other
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navigation references systems. To evaluate the performance of user equipment in the
presence of GPS interference, or to develop new technologies capable of meeting user
navigational needs in the absence of GPS, the 746th required a non-GPS based
positioning system (NGBPS). This precise NGBPS would be used as a “truth”
reference in the course of test and evaluation over the White Sands Missile Range and
is referred to as the Ultra High Accuracy Reference System (UHARS).
The 746th Test Squadron chose to adapt Locata technology to meet its UHARS
requirements based on Locata’s demonstrated successes (Craig 2011). Prior to 2010
Locata had been successfully demonstrated for commercial application in mining and
indoor warehouse automation to centimeter level accuracy (Barnes 2005). The
UHARS would require performance over much wider areas, tracking maneuvering
aircraft at over 500km/hr. Locata was contracted to update their technology and
demonstrate the following enhancements:








Locata Receivers must acquire and track signals at a minimum range of 30 miles
Nanosecond level “TimeLoc” synchronization of LocataLites at these ranges
Transmit Locata signals at higher power via external amplifier while maintaining signal
and TimeLoc integrity
Design and apply transmitter and receiver antennas to provide adequate gain and
multipath mitigation under aircraft dynamics
Demonstrate adequate receiver tracking loop performance under aircraft dynamics
Develop tropospheric models that mitigate large errors experienced by terrestrial
signals propagated over long ranges
Ensure post-processed accuracy better than 18cm 3D-RMS (PDOP<3) at long range

To meet these challenges Locata focused on four key enhancements. First, the
range of each LocataLite signal had to be increased from approximately 10km to over
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50km. A suitable external amplifier was chosen to increase transmitted power from
100 milliwatts to 10 watts. Second, to achieve a 3D solution at altitude, antennas with
suitable gain patterns had to be developed to reach LocataLites directly below aircraft
as well as near the horizon. Third, the LocataLite receivers had to demonstrate the
ability to track signals from banking and maneuvering aircraft. The expected range and
acceleration rates had to be simulated on the ground and tracked prior to demonstration
at White Sands. Fourth, the errors induced by propagating a signal through 30 miles of
the troposphere had to be appropriately modeled and removed. Through accurate
modeling, and metrological data gathering in real time this error was reduced from
approximately 280 parts per million (about 13.5 meters at 30 miles) to only a few parts
per million, or 4.5 centimeters.
In October of 2011, a scaled UHARS was demonstrated on the White Sands Missile
Range in an area of approximately 35km by 30km. The network, shown in Figure 3,
was made up of ten LocataLites synchronized via TimeLoc hops of up to 7 miles. The
primary master LocataLite was positioned on a mountain top which provided a clear
line-of-sight to all but one of the LocataLites. This stranded LocataLite was
successfully included in the network via a single “hop” to the master. Throughout
testing, the UHARS network was able to maintain nano-second level timing
synchronization after approximately 30 seconds of initialization time. During the
demonstration an Air Force C-12 was flown with a Locata receiver as well as a GPS
receiver and inertial reference unit to collect truth data for post processing.
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Figure 3: UHARS Pseudolote Network
Transmitting at 10 watts allowed the test aircraft to acquire the UHARS signal at a
range of 62km. Once acquired, signals were tracked at a range of 66km. Recall, the
746th’s minimum range to acquire and track was 48km. During the flight test data was
collected in a race track pattern at 195kts, 25,000ft above sea level. Range to a typical
LocataLite varied from approximately 25km to 35km during the bulk of the test. This
provided received signal strength from approximately -95dBm to -100dBm. These
values will be used as a reference when predicting performance of an APNT system
built on a national scale.
The data gathered during flight testing showed that the UHARS system met the
746th Test Squadrons accuracy requirements. Tracking all 10 LocataLites, the
Positional-Dilution of Precision (PDOP) averaged 2.35, with a worst case of 3. The
vertical dilution was the largest contributor to DOP at an average of 2.06. Given a
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PDOP of less than 3, the 746th required a positioning accuracy of 18cm or better. The
Locata UHARS system was able to demonstrate a carrier solution RMS accuracy of
17.4cm. A more robust code based solution provided 24.5cm 3 dimensional RMS
accuracy.
Based on its performance when applied to the UHARS, Locata technology could be
a good candidate for a nationwide APNT system. This thesis will evaluate how a
pseudolite system meets NextGen APNT requirements from an operational standpoint
and it will also evaluate how the UHARS could be modified to meet performance
requirements. The primary challenge of adapting the UHARS to APNT is scale.

ADS-B
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) is one of the primary
improvements in NextGen architecture. ADS-B will allow the FAA to transition the air
traffic control system from primarily using ground based RADAR to primarily using
precise positioning sources such as Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) enabled
GPS. NAS surveillance will be “dependent” upon aircraft reported position by 2025.
The transition to ADS-B has many operational benefits, including decreased separation
minimums between aircraft, air-to-air surveillance for increased safety and awareness,
and more efficient use of resources as legacy surveillance and navigation infrastructure
is decommissioned.
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All aircraft operating in controller airspace are required to transmit an ADS-B
Out signal prior to 2020. (Federal Aviation Administration 2010). This ADS-B out
signal has many components but consists primarily of the aircrafts position, altitude,
and velocity information, as well as unique aircraft identification information. The
ADS-B Out messages broadcast from nearly every aircraft in the NAS are received by
Ground Based Transceivers (GBT) and combined to build a picture of airborne traffic.
This information is then delivered to air traffic controllers and re-broadcast to aircraft
equipped with ADS-B In equipment. In this fashion, both aircrew and air traffic
controllers will have the same, precise, near real time situational picture of the NAS.
ADS-B In is not yet a requirement at any point in the future, therefore, aircraft without
this capability will rely on visual separation and ATC guidance for separation.
ADS-B Out messages will be transmitted on one (or both) of two signals.
Above 18,000’ MSL, all aircraft must transmit on what is known as “1090 Extended
Squitter”. 1090ES is a 1Mbps message encoded on a 1090 MHz carrier wave (Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics, SC-186 2006). Below 18,000’ MSL aircraft
operators will have the option to transmit ADS-B Out through a Universal Access
Transceiver (UAT) in 1Mbps messages encoded on 978 MHz carrier channel (Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics, SC-186 2009) s. The ADS-B Out information
is received by ATC on the ground or by ADS-B In and TCAS equipped aircraft in the
air. What is important to note, again, is that in the absence of surveillance RADAR and
in congested airspace, surveillance relies on precise position information broadcast via
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ADS-B. The dissemination of surveillance information via ADS-B In and ADSRebroadcast (ADS-R) is beyond the scope of this thesis.
ARNS Band Users
A constraint placed on any potential APNT system is that it must operate within
the Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service (ARNS) band. This band spans from 960
MHz to 1215 MHz and is protected not only by the FCC but by international treaty
(CFR Title 47, Part 87 2012). Although the band is ideal for an APNT signal because
of the protection and monitoring it is afforded, it is a very “crowded” band. The
systems that currently utilize channels within the band span from end to end, some on
hundreds of narrow channels, others on a single wide-band channel.
As mentioned above, ADS-B Out information will be transmitted via the UAT.
UATs will also be used to transmit and receive Traffic Information Service (TIS-B),
and Flight Information Service (FIS-B). Delivering this information to the cockpit is a
major enabling capability of NextGen operational improvements. TIS-B and FIS-B are
means of delivering information about nearby aircraft, and flight planning information
such as airspace restrictions, hazardous weather reports, and weather imagery.
The UAT signal is centered on 978 MHz and modulated using continuous
phase, frequency shift keying (CPFSK). Because the UATs will be numerous and
channel saturation is a potential hazard, the signal is “spread” using a Time Domain
Multiple Access technique. This TDMA scheme minimizes the effect of UAT signals
on adjacent channels while allowing many simultaneous co-channel operators. The
UAT TDMA frame is one second long. Ground stations will be assigned fixed message
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start opportunities (MSOs) within the first 176 msec of each frame. Airborne UATs
transmit on pseudo randomly varying MSOs within the latter 800 msec of each frame.
This ensures that no ground UATs will interfere with another ground UAT, and
airborne interference will be intermittent and unlikely to occur in consecutive frames
(Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, SC-186 2009).
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) is used to determine range from fixed
ground stations. Airborne transceivers “interrogate” the ground station on a channel
unique to that ground station. The ground station replies on an associated, but offset by
63 MHz, channel after a brief delay. The time required to receive the reply at the
aircraft is used to determine range. The interrogation and reply signals are made up of
brief pulses spaced at fixed intervals. This intermittent nature of the signal has allowed
other ARNS systems to use the same frequencies as DME on a non-interference basis.
DME occupies narrow channels spaced at 1 MHz from 962 MHz to 1215 MHz (FAA
1984). A few of these channels are in limited use because of their proximity to other
ARNS signals or their application, as in the case of mobile TACAN (MILSTD-291C
1998).
DME signals are often associated with other navigation signals such as
TACAN, VOR, and ILS (CFR Title 47, Part 87 2012). The channel pairings between
DME interrogation, DME reply and these associated systems are often fixed and
published. Therefore, if an APNT source might interfere with these DME channels,
consideration must be given to the effects on the associated systems. This will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.
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The Air Traffic Control RADAR Beacon Service (ATCRBS) occupies two wide
bands of the ARNS band. The ATCRBS is the only means of surveillance today, and
although a few transmitters will be decommissioned as ADS-B becomes operational,
this band is not likely to become available anytime soon. Ground based surveillance
RADAR and transponder interrogation signals are transmitted at 1030 MHz. The reply
signals from airborne transponders are centered on 1090 MHz. These signals are high
powered and may carry modulated data at rates of up to 1 Mbps (RTCA 2008). For this
reason DME and TACAN channels within approximately 10 MHz of 1030 MHz or
1090 MHz are not in common usage. Other ARNS systems have made similar
compromises to avoid interference with the ATCRBS.
The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) is, as the name
suggests, a data-link used in the United States and by our allies for military purposes.
The JTIDS signal allows secure communication between many types of vehicles and
hand held devices. The JTIDS signal was placed in the ARNS band on a noninterference basis. To meet this requirement the JTIDS uses a TDMA scheme to
spread its energy over the ARNS band.
The JTIDS occupies 51 channels between 969 MHz and 1206 MHz. The
channels are spaced approximately 3 MHz apart and there are notable gaps from 10081053 MHz and 1065-1113 MHz. These gaps prevent interference with ATCRBS. The
TDMA architecture provides message start opportunities spaced approximately 8 msec
apart. The low duty cycle and message pulse signature prevents interference with any
particular DME or TACAN channel (DoD 2012).
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As part of its GPS modernization effort, the DOD has added an additional
navigation signal to newer GPS satellites. The signal, referred to as L5, is an open
signal for civilian use in the ARNS band. It is intended to be a more reliable signal and
add redundancy for use in safety of life applications. The first satellite to broadcast an
L5 signal was launched in 2010. This L5 signal is centered on 1176 MHz and is
modulated similarly to the GPS L1 and L2 signals, although at a much faster chipping
rate. The 10.23 MHz chipping rate spreads the L5 signal over approximately 20 MHz
(GPS Directorate 2011). Because the energy of the signal is spread over a wide band,
is modulated by binary phase shift keying (BPSK), and is received at low power levels
by the user, it is able to share the ARNS band with multiple DME and TACAN
channels.
The European Space Agency is currently launching its own form of GNSS,
known as Galileo. By the end of 2013, six of thirty planned satellites will have been
launched. Each current Galileo satellite will broadcast several navigation signals, the
E5 signal will reside in the ARNS band. The E5 signal is modulated using CDM like
the GPS but is modulated using an Alternative Binary Offset Carrier scheme. This
method results in what is effectively two adjacent 20MHz wide signals centered on
1176 MHz and 1207 MHz (European Union 2010). Although this may be an
oversimplification for many applications, it will suffice here.
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Precise Timing
Precise time synchronization is critical to any pseudolite or MLAT type APNT
solution. The relative synchronization of all the network nodes is directly related to the
ranging and positioning precision of the system. The internal time reference that is
used may be from any source, so long as each node follows the same reference. In the
case of Locata and the UHARS, this time reference may be GPS time or the internal
quartz oscillator of the master LocataLite (Locata Corporation 2011). Without a robust
and precise method of synchronizing nodes, each node must be capable of maintaining
accurate time on its own.
To maintain the required positioning accuracy of an APNT system, timing
errors can be converted to range errors. Based on Required Navigation Performance
(RNP) and surveillance accuracy requirements in NextGen airspace an APNT system
will have to provide a positioning accuracy of 92.6m. Accounting for geometric DOP
and estimated ranging accuracy of the APNT source, any time synchronization would
have to be accurate to approximately 50 ns, or about 15 meters (Lo, Akos and Dennis,
Time Source Options for Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012).
Achieving this level of accuracy over an area the size of the United States fortunately is
not necessary. Nationwide reference to UTC within 20 seconds is sufficient to meet
APNT and RNAV performance requirements (Reference chapter IV). Fortunately,
nanosecond relative time synchronization is only necessary between those pseudolites
in view of a single receiver and used for a position solution.
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Synchronizing clocks can be broken into three components.

First, the accuracy

of the reference must be adequate. For flexibility and integration into other systems
UTC may be used as a reference time standard. Space based references such as GPS
and WAAS may achieve 15-30 ns accuracy. Second, a means of distributing precise
updates to each node of the network must exit. Updates may be transmitted wirelessly
from terrestrial sources, space based sources; or transmitted terrestrially via fiber or
cable. Updates must be frequent enough to accommodate the drift rate of each node’s
internal clock. Third, an accurate frequency reference must be present at each node.
The reference must be accurate enough to “drift” until the next synchronization update
occurs or used as a hold over during interference and outages (Lo, Akos and Dennis,
Time Source Options for Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012).
Terrestrial, wireless distribution of an accurate time reference depends on the
availability of line-of-site between pseudolites. Over flat terrain, each pseudolite in a
UHARS type system would require a 400ft tall tower to synchronize clocks 50nmi
apart due to the curvature of the Earth. This is not only impractical but the accuracy of
the reference would degrade by 2 ns with each “hop” (Locata Corporation 2011).
Terrestrial hard-wired connections would likely require a dedicated fiber to each
pseudolite and may degrade by 5ns with each hop. Space based wide area
synchronization is currently the only method practically available and capable of the
precision required by APNT. Space based time synchronization is both practical and
accurate but is vulnerable to interference and has common failure modes to the very
navigation systems APNT is designed to backup.
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As an alternative to the GPS, an APNT system must be able to tolerate
reasonable interference and outages of the GPS. A precise frequency reference at each
pseudolite, such as a Rubidium Oscillator, may be used to “coast” through a GPS
outage for up to 12hrs at a cost of less than $1500 per clock (Lo, Akos and Dennis
2012). This would mitigate the effects powerful jammers or GPS outages unrelated to
jamming. To provide robustness to jamming a pseudolite may use several techniques.
In a 2010 paper to the FAA on timing sources, Lo, Akos, and Dennis describe
controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA) that may provide 20-40dB of suppression
to terrestrial jammers. The GPS now transmits civil navigation signals on three
frequencies, requiring jammers to spread their power over a broad spectrum. The
higher power and architecture of newer GPS signals provides up to 15dB of resistance
over older signals. Resistance to jamming provided by CRPA antennas, GPS
modernization, and improved receiver design would likely prevent any wide denial of
service to a space based time reference. An APNT network could be designed then, to
accommodate localized outages of up to 12 hours with current technology.
Time Distribution
Locata’s technique of time synchronization is one of its distinguishing
characteristics from other forms of pseudolites. Through the process referred to as
TimeLoc, each pseudolite adjusts the transmission time of its own signal to match the
transmission time of a master pseudolite’s ranging signal. The signals are matched in
phase but with up to six cycles of ambiguity (Locata Corporation 2011). For a
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pseudolite to use TimeLoc, it must be able to receive the ranging signal of the master
just as any user receiver would: via line-of-sight radio link.
The current architecture of Locata dictates that each pseudolite attempt to slave
it’s signal to a master. If the master is not in sight, the pseudolite will synchronize its
clock to another pseudolite that is in view of the master. The pseudolites are then
“daisy-chained” together and time distribution is cascaded beyond line-of-sight from
the original master LocataLite. Distributing time via line-of-sight on a continental scale
is almost certainly cost prohibitive because of the number of pseudolites that would be
required. Accuracy of TimeLoc degrades with each step in the cascade as well. It
should be noted here that this degradation is not cumulative, but only significant to the
user in relative terms. Pseudolites on the east coast may be a full second off of
pseudolites on the west coast if TimeLoc were cascaded across the country. The
relative accuracy of each pseudolite in view of the receiver will determine position
error due to clock error.
TimeLoc does provide a potentially valuable solution to robust time
distribution. While cascaded TimeLoc on a continental scale is not likely, TimeLoc on
a local scale could provide a backup to space based time distribution or help to improve
the accuracy of a local network. Localized TimeLoc would rely on space based time
distribution as a reference at the master LocataLite. The master would then distribute
time via TimeLoc to all pseudolites in view. Cities such as Denver and Salt Lake City
provide ideal geometry for this method. A master LocataLite placed high on the
horizon could be in view of all pseudolites placed around the airport on lower, flat
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terrain. Each pseudolite could reference GPS time as an integrity check when
available. LocataLite firmware could also be designed to autonomously restructure the
LocataNet to designate any pseudolite with a strong GPS signal as the local master.
This flexibility may protect against mobile GPS interference presented by personal
privacy jammers.
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III. Operational Architecture
To gain a fuller understanding of APNT and NextGen, a Systems Engineering
approach was taken. Using the DoD Architecture Framework, Use Cases and a series
of Operational Viewpoints (OVs) were first created. Part of the FAA’s desired
outcome for this research was to use Systems Engineering methods to determine if the
UHARS could serve as a suitable APNT source. This portion of the architecture
development takes a step back and will analyze the suitability of APNT performance
requirements, as stated by the APNT team and within the APNT CONOPs, for meeting
NextGen Operational Improvements. The architecture allows for a traceable
connection from the Operational Improvements promised by NextGen at the enterprise
level, to scenario based Use Cases and Operational Activities, finally to specific
attributes and measures of any APNT system. Chapter IV will cover the System Views
(SVs) in detail and specifically cover performance of the UHARS when applied to
APNT
Use Cases and Operational Activities
The APNT CONOPS describes two unique scenarios that involve operations
within NextGen airspace. The scenarios allow the reader to walk through every phase
of flight, from pre-flight planning, to post-flight parking, and witness the interaction
between the users and the NAS. The scenarios read like a narrative of each flight, with
occasional interruptions to describe what would occur if GPS service (which NextGen
operations will depend on for critical functions) were interrupted, expectedly or not.
Between the two scenarios every phase of flight is covered and the associated functions
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of APNT are encountered. There are seven areas of emphasis in the scenarios that
roughly fall into two categories. The first category involves collaborative (airlines,
aircrew, and the ANSP) management of the airspace and information sharing. These
areas are indirectly dependent on precision navigation and are not considered here.
The second category involves 4D trajectory (4DT) management, aircraft separation,
and increased flexibility of en-route and airport operations. An evolution of the routing
in today’s flight plans, 4DTs define the flight path in space and time that an aircraft is
planned to follow. There are three areas of emphasis that were considered to build the
Operational Activity Diagram in Figure 4:




Trajectory Management – the process of defining and flying a 4DT that considers
capacity, flow contingencies and many other performance-based factors, known as
Trajectory Based Operations (TBO)
Separation Management – the processes and procedures used to safely separate
aircraft both on the airport surface and in the air
Flexible Airports and Surface Operations – where procedures and tools are
available to improve throughput, surface movement, and environmental
performance. These areas of emphasis are directly enabled by precision area
navigation.

The initial direction for architecture product development was to create a list of use
cases from scenarios in the CONOPs. What soon emerged was a set of use cases in
which the underlying activities were all common. A scheduled airline flight that
wished to follow a 4DT ultimately must use the same methods and sources of
navigation as a private flight. An air traffic controller will use the same tools to
manage traffic approaching a busy airport as they would to provide flexible routing
around a storm. After several iterations; a Use Case Diagram was developed to provide
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a graphic relationship of the Operational Activities related to positioning in NextGen
airspace.
Figure 4 is a representation of the relationships between users, service providers,
and the Activities derived from Operational Scenarios. The primary actors that will
interact in NextGen operations are depicted on the left. The three primary actors are
the Aircrew who operate the aircraft, Flight Operations who are responsible for flight
planning and scheduling, and the ANSP who will work with both to ensure efficient,
effective, and safe routing of aircraft. The actors on the right are service providers of
enabling systems. In the center are the various activities directly related to position and
timing. The top left corner of the diagrams lists aircraft “states” which will be
discussed later in the chapter. Each activity in the diagram may occur during any phase
of flight or aircraft state. The aircraft state, combined with the activity, will determine
the performance required from APNT.
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Figure 4: Operational Activity Model

What can be derived from this diagram is that all paths ultimately lead to
determining an aircraft’s position and time. Testing the system by introducing GPS
interference, as is done in the CONOPs scenarios, reveals loss of service that
significantly impacts smooth, safe operations of the NAS. As the FAA transitions to
NextGen operations, surveillance RADAR coverage will be minimized for cost
savings. Legacy navigation systems such as VOR and DME will also be gradually
removed. While VOR, DME, and RADAR may exist in busy areas of the NAS, it will
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not be accurate enough for positioning and surveillance via ADS-B. Without an APNT
source, in the absence of GPS, safe recovery of aircraft becomes questionable and
increased capacity is lost in busy airspace. Without an APNT source suitable for ADSB many of the benefits of NextGen would disappear.
The operational activities described above were traced to NAS services at the
enterprise level. Each activity can be correlated to a service which the FAA is
mandated to provide to the NAS. Figure 5 illustrates this correlation. Note that not all
mission services are influenced by APNT. All supporting NextGen programs would be
considered to gain a complete picture of NAS services.

Figure 5: Enterprise Service Traceability
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Activity Diagrams
The operational activities described above were developed in more detail using
Enterprise Architect (EA). EA allows the user to build scenario based activity
diagrams from structured use cases. This tool is simple to use as a starting point for
developing activity diagrams. It offered an easy transition from the CONOPs scenarios
to activity diagrams. The first step was to develop the activity (or use case) relationship
model in Figure 4. The second step was to flesh out each use case with a basic path in
the Scenario tool. Right clicking on any activity in the diagram, opening the
“properties” tab, followed by the “scenarios” tab, will bring up the window depicted in
Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Scenario Based Activity Diagrams
From here basic paths are developed as the scenarios play out. Alternate paths can be
developed at each step based on scenarios described in the CONOPS or other sources.
Exception paths are entered when an alternate path to the desirable outcome does not
exist. These may highlight system shortfalls that need to be addressed. Other activities
referenced in Actions are automatically hyperlinked and a hierarchy of activities begins
to form. Once all steps are entered EA will automatically generate an activity diagram
that is consistent with the scenario. This diagram resembles the DoDAF OV-5 Activity
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Model. The output is shown in Figure 7 for ADS-B Out. The output may not be
optimized for viewing, or it may not include alternate paths, exceptions, or other details
that should be included for completeness. The final draft of the ADS-B Out diagram is
shown in Figure 8.

Figure 7: Auto-generated ADS-B Out
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Figure 8: Final ADS-B Out
This is a powerful tool for developing activity diagrams that are consistent with
scenarios and use cases. It also provides a convenient way to show the interaction
between activities.

It is important to remember that the initial auto-generated diagram
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is only a time saving step and should be thoroughly reviewed to make sure it is clear
and complete. Iteration between the activity diagram and underlying use case scenarios
should be expected.
Each complete activity diagram can be used to highlight the alternate paths that
exist and those which must be utilized in the absence of GPS. The activities modeled
are those which relate directly to determining 3D position and time and are predicated
on the aircraft involved being in controlled airspace and utilizing ANSP services.
Aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) can always continue to a safe landing
without the aid of APNT, although benefits of improved SA are lost. Airline flights
must file IFR and would be significantly impacted even in good weather. The alternate
paths shown generally result in an exception path when no acceptable outcome exits. If
a safe, but perhaps less desirable outcome exits, the alternate path is shown. Detailed
discussion of some unacceptable outcomes and alternate paths is embedded in the EA
file and should be continuously updated as the FAA matures its plan for APNT. Below
is a brief discussion of the activity diagrams and what they reveal.
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Figure 9: Determine 3D Position and Time
The multiple paths for determining an aircraft position are depicted in Figure 9
above. Five positioning sources are listed; GPS and APNT being the most precise and
preferred methods in NextGen 2025. The accuracy, integrity, and availability of the
position source will vary depending on the path chosen along with several other factors
and is not shown in this diagram. Two important takeaways from this diagram are as
follows. First, only GPS or an APNT source compliant with 14 CFR Part 91-314 (the
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Federal ruling on ADS-B operation and performance) will be acceptable for ADS-B
Out. The CFR ruling on ADS-B requires a horizontal position accuracy of 92.6m
during all phases of flight.

The second point of note is that as legacy navigation aids

are removed and surveillance RADAR coverage is reduced, no acceptable means of
determining position would exist in the absence of GPS or APNT.
Figures 10 and 11 below illustrate Navigation and Surveillance; activities which
were once carried out by aircrew and the ANSP exclusively. In NextGen 2025 the lines
are blurred when surveillance becomes dependent on aircrew (via ADS-B Out) reported
position. In the event of GPS interference or outage both surveillance and navigation
performance levels are reduced or lost entirely.
The conclusions drawn from all of these architecture products begin to appear
the same after only a few iterations. Without stating anything about required
performance levels (other than GPS is currently the only source that meets all accuracy
requirements) it is apparent that an APNT source is necessary for navigation and
dependent surveillance.
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Figure 10: Navigate
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Figure 11: Fuse Surveillance Data
Operational Nodes
An Operational Node Diagram, or OV-2, was created in conjunction with the
Activity diagrams above. Figure 12 illustrates both the “To-Be” and “As-Is”

46

connectivity of operational nodes relative to APNT. The functions performed at each
node are listed. The connections shown in red are those that must be provided with an
APNT source.
Two critical connections are drawn from the APNT source to the Aircraft and to
the UAT network. These connection paths will include the Position reference provided
by APNT as well as the time reference required for operations in the NAS. Providing
position is the primary role of APNT but precision time can be equally as critical.
Currently, time reference to UTC +/- 30 seconds is all that is required (Federal Aviation
Administration 2012) for TBO and operations within the NAS. The red, bolded
connectors with a “?” attached indicate the potential need for a more precise timing
reference source. APNT (in pseudolite form) will require much more precise timing
synchronization (on the order of Nano seconds) than the operational requirements of
the NAS. This may come from the GPS or other GNSS source, or it may come from an
as yet undefined terrestrial source.

ANSP and UAT functions that rely on TDMA

communications could also benefit from the presence of an Alternate Precision Timing
reference to the GPS. The APNT CONOPs has scoped the FAA’s work to exclude this
precision timing capability except as required for pseudolite clock synchronization.
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Figure 12: Operational Node Connectivity
Performance By Zone
The activity diagrams described above indicate the need for position and timing
reference but they do not provide insight into what level of performance is required.
Several questions must be asked about the APNT source. How accurate must my
position be? What is the probability accuracy might exceed these limits without my
being aware of it? Where, and when must it be available? The activity diagrams are
inappropriate for answering these questions because they would have to be modified for
phase of flight, airspace designation, or other potentially limitless scenarios. To begin
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to answer these performance questions, aircraft “states” and APNT “Zones” were
pulled from the APNT CONOPs and correlated.
APNT Zones are defined in Figure 13 below. The precise definition of Zone 3
may change to accommodate a larger percentage of arrivals. The number of airports
currently being considered for a Zone 3 Terminal area is 135 and is based on the
amount of traffic that each airport handles in a given year. Zone 1 and 2 cover all of
CONUS and are distinguished only by altitude. There are spaces in this diagram that
are not to be serviced by APNT. Everywhere below Zone 2 and Zone 3 cones will be
without APNT service. Ground traffic will not be serviced by APNT. This will have
an impact on departures and arrivals at airports without a Zone 3 service volume
overhead, requiring aircraft to climb to 5000’ AGL before reaching navigation service.

Figure 13: APNT Zones
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Table 1 describes each aircraft state in the APNT CONOPs. It is a complete list
of possible states from the beginning of a flight to the end of a flight. These aircraft
states, combined with APNT Zone can be used to define the level of performance
required from APNT. In the APNT CONOPS scenarios an aircraft utilizes GPS in
every state and is affected in some way by loss of GPS. Refer to the GPS CONOPs for
a detailed description of these effects.
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Table 1: Aircraft States
Aircraft State
Number

Aircraft State
Name

01

Parked

02

Taxi-Out

03

Takeoff Position

04
05

Takeoff Roll
Initial Climb

06

Climb

07
08

Cruise
Top of Descent

09

Initial Descent

10

Arrival

11

Initial Approach

12

Approach

13

Missed Approach

14
15

Landing
Landing Rollout

16

Taxi-in

17

Leader Aircraft

18

Follower Aircraft

Description
The aircraft is parked at the gate or on the ramp and the
starting/ending point for flight
The aircraft has started taxiing to the assigned runway
for takeoff
The aircraft is in position on the runway and ready to
start the takeoff roll
The aircraft is advancing down the runway and lifts off
This is the segment where gear are retracted, power is
reduced for climb and the aircraft begins to follow the
flight path for departure
The aircraft is climbing along a prescribed path
following a departure procedure and there may be leveloffs during the climb for other traffic
This is the en route phase of flight
A point in space and time where the aircraft will start a
descent toward the destination
The segment of the descent that begins at the end of
cruise and continues until the aircraft has begun an
arrival to an airport
The segment flown on a path leading to the start of an
approach procedure; in the Current Environment a
standard terminal arrival route
Approaching on an intercept to a final approach path
segment in the Current Environment and any segment
that leads to a turn to final approach in the target
environment
The segment between the final approach fix and
decision height
The path flown that begins at a point inside the final
approach fix and continues to the missed approach
waypoint.
From decision height to touchdown
The segment on the runway where the aircraft is
decelerating and exiting the runway
The segment where the aircraft is proceeding to the gate
or ramp
The aircraft is leading along a trajectory where another
aircraft is following and maintaining spacing off of the
leader
The follower is using ADS-B-In information to station
keep on the leader
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Based on discussions with the FAA’s APNT team and the APNT CONOPs,
APNT designs must only support aircraft states 6 through 11. There is no requirement
for APNT on the ground. Ground surveillance from MLAT exists at larger airports.
For now, secondary airport ground operations may suffer during low visibility in the
absence of GPS. APNT is not required beyond the Final Approach Fix (FAF) or in
terminal areas not covered by Zone 3. ILS will be used to guide aircraft to the runway
below approximately 1500’ AGL. Departures may be delayed or cancelled at smaller
airports, or for aircraft not equipped with more expensive RNAV equipment. Figure
14, below, illustrated which aircraft states are likely to occur in each APNT Zone. This
figure is perhaps the most revealing of the architectural products. The vertical “swim
lanes” indicate the associated Zone. The bubbles indicate the aircraft activity or state.
Notice that several activities are duplicated. For example, aircraft will be arriving and
departing from both secondary airports and those serviced by Zone 3 APNT so two
instances of Arrival are depicted. Boxes around activities indicate navigation and
surveillance services provided. Secondary RADAR coverage and VOR minimum
operating network (VOR MON) coverage will be significantly reduced in NextGen
2025, increasing reliance on the GPS and APNT.
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Figure 14: Operational State by APNT Zone

The attributes, measures, and performance requirements which are used to
describe an APNT service are common to precision navigation and surveillance sources
in use today. Several references are used to build a complete picture of these values
including U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices. A compilation of these
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values can be seen in Appendix A which is taken from the APNT CONOPs. Columns
correlating APNT Zone and Aircraft state to performance have been added.
Appendix A divides criteria into categories of navigation, surveillance, and
timing. Each category has unique attributes and measures associated. Table 2, below,
outlines the attributes and measures that will be applied to APNT. The final two,
capacity and compatibility have been added in this report for completeness.
Pseudolites, by design and similar to the GPS, have no capacity limit. Compatibility is
considered in Chapter V and has many facets. An APNT system must not interfere
with other critical NAS systems and it must be integrated into every aircraft that will
operate in controlled airspace.
Table 2: Attributes and Measures
Attributes
Accuracy

Integrity

Surveillance
Availability
Continuity
Capacity
Compatibiliy

Measures
Navigation Accuracy Code (NAC) - 95% probability
that reported position is within a specified distance of
true position
Navigation Integrity Code (NIC) -10-7 probability of
exceeding this boundary per flight hour or per
approach
Surveillance Integrity Limit (SIL) - Probability of
exceeding NIC per flight hour or per approach without
alarm
Probability of availability per flight hour for any given
operation
Probability of continuous avalailability for a prescribed
time period, given availability at the beginning of an
operation
Total number of users simultaneously supported for all
operations in a given service volume
Simultaneous operation with other cockpit avionics
and wireless systems in the NAS.
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Finally, the minimum performance requirements for each APNT Zone can be derived.
Traceability from Activity to State to Zone in the preceding sections has been
established. The table in Appendix A can be reduced to the most demanding
requirements in each Zone. The following steps were taken to reduce Appendix A to
Table 3.



Eliminate all flight operations (rows) that do not occur in an APNT Zone
Compare Accuracy and NAC, keep the lower of the two values. Surveillance is
always more demanding.
Compare Containment and SIL, keep the lower of the two values. Again,
Surveillance is more demanding for all cases.
By Aircraft Zone, determine the most demanding performance values in the
remaining cells.




Table 3: Desired Performance Levels
Navigation
Nautical Miles

Surveillance
Nautical Miles

(>99.0% Availability)

(>99.9% Availability)

Accuracy Containment Separation

Airspace Zone

(95%)

(NACp)

(NIC)

2
3

Time Performance
+/- Minutes
RTP1

(SIL)

(10-7 )

/flight hour
N/A

S
1

Continuity

1

2

3-5

0.05 (8)

0.2 (7)

10-7 (3)

10-4

1

1

2

3

0.05 (8)

0.2 (7)

10-7 (3)

10-4

2

0.3

0.6

3

0.05 (8)

0.2 (7)

10-7 (3)

10-5

20 sec

Table 3 provides the performance requirements that will be evaluated in Chapter
V. Navigation and surveillance are kept separate to illustrate the more demanding
requirement that Surveillance will place on an APNT system. While surveillance
RADAR systems are still in operation around our nation’s busiest airports the
performance requirements of APNT might be relaxed to those of navigation. This table
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answers the simplest question, “How accurate does APNT have to be?” Any APNT
source has a desired 95% accuracy of .05 nautical miles (or 92.6 meters) and an
integrity limit of .2 nautical miles. This would be sufficient to support 3 mile
separation of aircraft in all Zones.
Table 4 illustrates the minimum performance levels of APNT set by the FAAs
APNT team. The APNT team has stated that required performance could be relaxed to
185 meters for accuracy and 1 nautical mile for integrity.

This is sufficient to support

5 nautical mile separation and may support safe recovery of aircraft in less congested
airspace. It is worth noting here again that CFR Part 91-314, the amendment governing
ADS-B, mandates 92.6m accuracy for surveillance purposes.
Table 4: Required Performance Levels
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Operational Improvements
The objective of this section is to determine if the stated performance level and
implementation of APNT described above will enable the planned Operational
Improvements of NextGen. NextGen planning is a collaborative effort between several
departments of the executive branch, including the Department of Transportation and
the FAA. The collective effort is referred to as the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO). The JPDO has developed a set of operational improvements to support
the NextGen operational activities of 2025. The comprehensive list contains 136 OIs
that affect flight planning, data sharing and management, navigation, safety,
environmental protection, and other areas. (JPDO 2012) The FAA has approved a set
of 94 OIs (FAA 2012) that are conveniently categorized by the enterprise level
services and solution sets they associate with. For this analysis the list was reduced to
65 that are related to navigation or are affected by precision navigation and timing.
The first step was to combine and consolidate the FAA and JPDO OIs into a
single list. The reference numbers of each OI are retained to show where there is
overlap and which OIs were unique to one organization. The FAA CONOPs has listed
the potential impact of GPS interference on each OI in the absence of an APNT source
and described how APNT might mitigate the impacts. This was carried through to the
remaining JPDO OIs. The level of impact is described on a scale of 1 to 3; a 1 meaning
the OI would not be possible without APNT or GPS, 2 meaning the OI would only
partially be realized, and 3 meaning the OI would be unaffected by GPS outage
regardless of APNT.
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The second step was to associate performance zones and aircraft states to each
OI. If an OI applies to more than one zone or state they are listed as well. In many
cases the OI applies to ground operations or secondary airports that would not be
covered by Zone 3. These are annotated with an “S”, “All”, or the shortfall description
includes lack of coverage for secondary airports.
The third step was to evaluate each OI based on the associated performance
zone and aircraft state, and the details of the OI as they relate to pseudolite based
APNT. The level of APNT support can then be determined on the same 3 point scale
described above. If the OI is not supported by APNT the OI receives a 1. If the OI is
fully supported it receives a 3. If APNT is not planned to support the zone associated
with an OI it receives a 1. This is an objective association. OIs that relate to
supporting general aviation or increasing capacity and flexibility at secondary airports
are harder to evaluate and the shortfall rating becomes more subjective.
Of the 63 OIs evaluated 22 were rated with a 1 or a 2. The majority of these
shortfalls are because of a lack of APNT provided on the surface. The second most
common shortfall is due to incomplete coverage of the NAS. APNT Zone 2 will only
serve 5000’ AGL and above and Zone 3 is only planned at 135 airports. Secondary
airports will not be supported by APNT and many OIs relate to increasing access and
flexibility at secondary airports. A third common shortfall is due to lack of precision
or service during the approach phase of flight. Many OIs that promise to increase
capacity in busy airspace or continued seamless operation during GPS outage rely on
precision approaches and RNAV flexibility. If APNT is limited to supporting only
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navigation to an ILS approach these OIs may only partially be supported. Figure 15
below is a section of the complete OI shortfall analysis posted here for convenience.
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FAA
JPDO
Identifier Identifier

105208

101103

104122

104124

Targeted
NextGen
Capability For
2025

Provides information to
the ANSP when APNT is
in use to identify GPS
system area outages

303

306

307

309

310

APNT Function

x

Provides position to
airborne and ground
automation to continue
the capability to
exchange flight planning
information and
negotiate flight
trajectory agreement
amendments
Provides position to
continue RNP and RNAV
operations while
maintaining 3nm
separation standards

Enables aircraft to
remain on original flight
plan to include the most
economical point in
which to begin a descent
using the most
economical power
Provides position to GA
aircraft for ADS-B
positioning for more
direct routing through
busy terminal area
airspace

Impact

1

APNT
Supported?

APNT Gap

Key Attributes

Availability,
Compatibility,
Capacity

3

Aircraft Performance
States
Zone

All

All

Name

Traffic Management Initiatives Individual flight-specific trajectory
with Flight Specific Trajectories changes resulting from Traffic
Management Initiatives (TMIs) will be
disseminated to the appropriate Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP)
automation for tactical approval and
execution. This capability will increase
the agility of the NAS to adjust and
respond
to dynamically
Provide Interactive Flight
Flight planning
activitieschanging
are
Planning from Anywhere

2

2

Not provided on
surface

Availability,
Continuity

All

All

Integrated Arrival/Departure
Airspace Management

2

3

Accuracy,
Compatibility

6, 8-13

1, 3

Use Optimized Profile Descent

1

1

3

2

Accuracy

Accuracy,
Availability,
Cost prohibits acces
Integrity,
to GA
Compatibility,
Capacity

8-11

6-11

3

3

Description

accomplished from the flight deck as
readily as any location. Airborne and
ground automation provide the
capability to exchange flight planning
information and negotiate flight
trajectory agreement amendments in
near real-time. The key change is that
the Air
Navigation
Service
New
airspace
design
takesProvider's
advantage of
expanded use of terminal procedures
and separation standards. This is
particularly applicable in major
metropolitan areas supporting multiple
high-volume airports. This increases
aircraft flow and introduces additional
routes and flexibility to reduce delays.
ANSP
decision
support
tools(OPDs)
are
Optimized
Profile
Descents

Solution Set

Service

* Improved efficiency
Improve
* Increased capacity
Collaborative ATM
* Improved predictability
* Reduced fuel-burn and
aircraft emissions

TM-Strategic Flow

Increased efficiency
Initiate Trajectory
Increased accessibility
Based Operations
Enhanced user-preferred
trajectories

Flight Planning

* Maximizes throughput
* Improved efficiency
* Reduced flight time
* Reduced noise
* Reduced fuel burn and
engine emissions

*Reduced noise
permit aircraft to remain at higher
*Reduced fuel-burn and
altitudes on arrival to the airport and
engine emissions
use lower power settings during
descent. OPD arrival procedures will
decrease noise and be more fuelefficient. The air navigation service
provider procedures and automation
OPDs
when operationally
Improved GA Access to Traverse accommodate
This Operational
Improvement
(OI)
Increased efficiency
Terminal Areas
results in increased access to busy
Increased accessibility
airspace, such as Class B, for General
Enhanced user-preferred
Aviation (GA) operators. More direct
trajectories
routing for GA operators is facilitated
through improved access to traverse
busy terminal area airspace via the
continued use and possible expansion
of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Flyways as

Figure 15: OI Shortfall Traceability Matrix
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Benefits

Increase
TMArrivals/Departures Synchronization
at High Density
Airports

Increase Flexibility TMin the Terminal
Synchronization
Environment

Increase Flexibility ATC-Separation
in the Terminal
Assurance
Environment

This iteration of pairing OIs to performance is an incomplete example of how
APNT will support NextGen 2025 but it does illustrate the discontinuity between stated
objectives and planned performance. This method of relating APNT performance to
Operational Improvements should be iterated with each decision milestone of APNT
planning as details are fleshed out. APNT does appear to support the four pillars
described in the CONOPS but one should ask: “What system will fill the APNT gaps
highlighted?
The APNT team has highlighted the following four “pillars” of APNT.





Safe recovery (landing) of aircraft flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions
(IMC) under Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) operations
Strategic modification of flight trajectories to avoid areas of interference and
manage demand within the interference area
Continued dispatch of air carrier operations to deny an economic target for an
intentional jammer
Flight operations continue without a significant increase in workload for either the
pilot or the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) during an interference event.

APNT will provide means for a safe recovery of aircraft but may not allow aircraft to
arrive at their intended destination. APNT will allow modification of trajectories but is
constrained by APNT Zone coverage. APNT will allow continued dispatch of aircraft,
but at potentially reduced capacity due to less precise positioning until at altitude or
non-universal equipage. Continued operation without an increase in workload will
require that flight planning be based on the least capable navigation system available
for a given operation. For example, if GPS allows less than 3 mile separation in busy
airspace and aircraft are allowed to reduce separation, in the event of a GPS outage,
controllers will have to manage re-spacing aircraft as navigation reverts to APNT.
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Relying on ILS for approach could also significantly increase workloads as aircraft are
re-routed to available approaches.

62

IV. UHARS System Architecture & Signal Performance Analysis
Chapter Overview
Chapter IV takes a closer look at Locata and the UHARS as they could be
applied to the APNT problem. The first section is a collection of Systems Views (SVs)
that describe the architecture of a Locata network. They illustrate the system nodes,
connections, and related functionality of a Locata Net. In principle, these SVs could
describe an APNT system on a continental scale but in reality it is precisely this scale
that will raise issues.
The second section describes the signal structure of Locata and proposes
potential changes to certain properties. Most changes to the Locata signal reflect the
need to integrate with existing radio systems in the ARNS band while propagating an
APNT signal for over 100nmi from hundreds of sites around the country. With the
proper signal masking it may be possible to increase the range of a Locata pseudolite
with few other changes to the signal and those options are presented here as well.
The final sections describe the predicted performance levels of a potential signal
structure and pseudolite network. The primary measure of positioning performance
here is user range error (URE). Factors such as DOP from poor signal geometry, or
unpredictable tropospheric errors may have a large effect on positioning accuracy and
are only roughly modeled. Based on the estimated service volume and accuracy of
each pseudolite, a rough estimate of the number of pseudolites required to cover Zones
1, 2, and 3 can be obtained. This analysis has been completed for other APNT
solutions and is referenced here.
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System Architecture
Locata networks have two primary segments. The first is the terrestrial segment
of pseudolites. This can be compared to the space segment of the GPS or other GNSS.
Each pseudolite broadcasts a ranging signal with an over-laid data stream that includes
(but is not limited to) surveyed location on the surface of the earth. GPS satellites
broadcast orbital parameters that can be used to compute their position as a function of
time. The second segment is the user segment, which is the same as the GPS user
segment. User equipment compares ranging signals from multiple pseudolites (in the
same manner as GPS satellites) which are presumably transmitted simultaneously or
with known error. These ranging signals can be used to determine user position and
clock error relative to the pseudolites’ frame of reference. Locata nets and the UHARS
do not have a control segment like the GPS. Once Locata nets are surveyed and
initialized they become autonomous although not entirely independent. Exceptions
include time synchronization and meteorological data collection. Locata pseudolites
require an external time reference to maintain synchronization to UTC. Within the
Locata network time is maintained by referencing the phase of signals sent between
pseudolites via line of site radios. This is referred to as TimeLoc. The UHARS utilizes
this method of time synchronization. To correct for tropospheric signal delay
pseudolites broadcast meteorological data including temperature, pressure, and relative
humidity. Collecting this information requires additional hardware.
Locata network and signal architecture resembles the GPS in many ways.
There are a few key differences so solve problems that arise when operating a terrestrial
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pseudolite system. TimeLoc is perhaps the most unique aspect of Locata technology.
GNSS require multiple precise clocks on board each satellite and extensive control
segments to keep each satellite clock synchronized. Locata gets around this challenge
by linking each pseudolite to a master pseudolite and synchronizing their navigation
signals to phase level accuracy. Each slave LocataLite receives the navigation signal
broadcast by the master LocateLite. Based on surveyed distance between the
LocataLites and signal error correction models, the slave LocataLite can determine the
cycle ambiguity of the pseudo-ranging signal to approximately 6 cycles (Locata
Corporation 2011). In this manner, with no outside time or frequency reference, the
inexpensive quartz oscillator in the master LocataLite is sufficient for nano-second time
synchronization and centimeter level accuracy. The trade-off is that TimeLoc requires
a line of sight wireless link between each pseudolite.
The second unique quality of Locata technology, relative to GNSS, is its
adaptation to solve the near-far problem of received signal strength. GNSS benefit
from nearly uniform separation between any user’s receiver and the satellite
constellation. The 23dB of separation provided by the 1023 chip Pseudo Random
Noise (PRN) code is more than adequate to separate multiple signals. User range to a
LocataLite in a UHARS scale application may vary from hundreds of meters to a
hundred kilometers. Receiver dynamic range could not accommodate simultaneous
reception of both near and far signals. Locata incorporates a TDMA scheme to further
separate the signals of each Locate Lite. Figure 16 illustrates this and will be described
in detail later in the chapter. What should be noted here is that each TDMA frame
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offers 10 time slots to broadcast a navigation signal. In this manner, up to 10
LocataLites could theoretically broadcast using the same PRN code in the same
geographic area and not interfere with each other.

Figure 16: Locata / UHARS TDMA Architecture (Locata Corporation 2011)
A complete Locata Network is divided into SubNets made up of up to 10
LocataLites each. There are enough unique PRN codes defined in the Locata Interface
Control Document (ICD) to accommodate 5 SubNets without the potential for overlap.
As long as each SubNet remains geographically separated, PRN codes could be
duplicated if more than 5 SubNets are required. Figure 17 illustrates the myriad of
ways in which a LocataNet and its SubNets may be related. In any LocataNet there is
one master reference which carries its own time reference or is fed an external
(commonly derived from GPS) time reference updated at 1Hz. The remaining
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LocataLites in the network become slaves to the master LocataLite via TimeLoc. Note
in Figure 17 that subnet 2 has cascaded the TimeLoc synchronization one level. 9
LocataLites in subnet 2 are slaved to an intermediate master. All LocataLites in Subnet
3 are slaved to a single slave LocataLite in Subnet 2. All LocataLites in Subnet 4 are
slaves to the original master LocataLite in Subnet 1. The Master-Slave relationship is
independent of the subnet structure of a LocataNet. Master-Slave relationships would
likely be determined by the most efficient means of connecting all LocataLites with the
fewest number of TimeLoc hops. Subnet relationships are carefully determined during
initial setup to ensure dynamic separation of LocataLite signals and will determine the
assignment of PRN codes and TDMA slot assignments for each LocataLite.
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Figure 17: LocataNet TimeLoc Architecture
Figure 18 illustrates the connectivity between LocataLites and user positioning
Receivers. In this particular network, NavSignal 3 comes directly from the master
LocataLite. NavSignals 1, 2, 4, and 5, come from LocataLites that are TimeLocked to
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the master. NavSignal 6 comes from a LocataLite that is separated from the master and
requires TimeLoc to be cascaded via Slave 4. This APNT receiver is receiving ranging
signals from 6 LocataLites: an over-determined solution. To determine a user’s
position, the Locata Receiver requires a minimum of four LocataLite signals. Three
signals to solve for position in 3 dimensions and a fourth signal to solve for the
receiver’s clock uncertainty. Reception from a fifth LocataLite creates an overdetermined solution can be used to detect false signals or erroneous signals. GPS
receivers use these over-determined solutions for Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM). This added integrity is required for use during approaches. Over
determined solutions are not difficult to come by when utilizing a GNSS. Having 1012 satellites in view and tracked is not uncommon. Pseudolites present a much greater
challenge because the likelihood of having many signals in range and in view is lower.
To reduce the number of required pseudolites in view the role of integrity monitoring is
shifted from the receiver and barometric altitude measured at the aircraft is used to aid
the solution. This will allow an APNT pseudolite receiver to provide a position fix and
receiver clock correction with only three signals. This diagram does not depict that
each LocataLite actually transmits the same coded signal on two separate carrier
frequencies, each from a physically separated antenna, for multi-path interference
mitigation. This duplicity is removed from the diagram for clarity as it does not lend to
an over-determined position.
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Figure 17: LocataLite Signal Connectivity
Signal Properties and Spectrum Usage
This section will cover several properties of the Locata and UHARS ranging
signals and their effect on ranging performance. Many of these properties could
remain the same if Locata is scaled up to meet APNT requirements while a few may
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have to change. Locata was developed as a commercially available positioning system
and meets certain constraints that would not apply to an APNT system. Of course,
APNT brings along its own requirements and constraints. Three primary differences to
keep in mind when reading the following section are as follows. First, Locata and the
UHARS operate in the 2.4-2.5 GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band.
This band does not require a license to operate but must accept interference from other
users and places limits on the power that can be transmitted. APNT will operate in the
ARNS band that does not directly limit power output but does require new systems to
operate on a non-interference basis. Secondly, APNT will cover much greater ranges.
Locata was designed to operate indoors or in urban environments at ranges of less than
a mile. APNT will almost certainly require signals to be effective at 100 nautical miles
or more so that the number of pseudolites required is affordable. Thirdly, APNT
system accuracy requirements can be relaxed from centimeters to nearly 100 meters.
Locata was modeled after the GPS. This is evident in the opening paragraphs of
Locata’s ICD. The direct sequence, bi-phase shift keying spread spectrum signal was
modified to fit into the 2.4GHz ISM band. The data stream was modified to
accommodate stationary pseudolites. And the number of PRN codes in use was
increased to accommodate an increase in signals on the network, although the method
of generating each PRN code remains the same.
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Carrier Frequency
The carrier frequency chosen for Locata and UHARS, as stated above, was
confined to the 2.4 GHz ISM band. LocataLites each transmit two signals,
differentiated by carrier frequency and PRN code, from each antenna (usually two) for
multipath mitigation. The two carrier frequencies chosen for Locata and UHARS are
2414.28 MHz (S1) and 2465.43 MHz (S6). These frequencies were chosen partly for
their convenient relationship to GPS carrier frequencies. A baseband oscillator used in
any GPS receiver will have a frequency of approximately 10.23 MHz

. GPS L1 at

1575.42 MHz is 154 times the base oscillator. Locata S1 is 236 times

, Locata S6 is

241 times

. Keeping receiver frequency plans as similar as possible can reduce cost

and complexity of receivers designed for dual use. The analysis in this thesis limits
carrier frequency choices to multiples of 10.23 MHz.
APNT will operate in the ARNS band between 960 MHz and 1215 MHz. The
myriad of systems already occupying this band is covered in Chapter II of this thesis.
The design of an APNT signal will have to fit within the ARNS band without
interfering with other systems. Accommodations could be made for a new APNT
signal, such as removing specific DME channels from widespread use, or limiting the
transmission power at certain sites. This was done for the addition of GPS L5 when
seven channels of JTIDS/Link 16 were marked for operation on a non-interference
basis. Figure 19 illustrates the complexity of the ARNS band. In this figure each
column represents the center frequency of an occupied channel. Signal properties such
as data overlays or spreading codes will “widen” these channels. The magnitude of
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each column is only to represent the related system and usage, not the relative power
density or any kind of priority. For example, all DME Ground reply channels are
approximately the same height for easier identification and those channels
recommended for removal are slightly shorter.
Figure 19 reveals a few unoccupied or less frequently used bands that should be
considered for APNT use. The most prominent gaps are those within DME channels to
accommodate ATCRBS. The ATCRBS signal has a data overlay that spreads the
signal and interferes with DME signals that might broadcast within +/- 10 MHz of 1030
or 1090 MHz. DME channels are paired for air-ground interrogation and ground-air
reply. They are also paired for air-air usage by the military and for VORTAC,
TACAN, and ILS usage. These relationships have left a few channels less frequently
used even though they are not adjacent to ATCRBS. This means that allocating a
specific frequency to a new APNT system may affect more than one system and more
than one channel. Minimizing these impacts should be considered. The FAA has
designated certain channels of DME as “uncommon”. The DoD has designated
approximately the same channels for mobile TACAN use which, at least domestically
or for long periods of time, would be in uncommon usage. These uncommon channels
are the shortest in Figure 19. Usable gaps occur at 960-977 MHz, and 1147-1156
MHz. 1147-1156 could be expanded to nearly 20 MHz by eliminating DME channels
70x-76x. Because the paired frequencies of 1094-1100 MHz are adjacent to 1090
MHz, these channels are in less common usage. 107 paired VORs would be affected in
the NAS today if these 7 channels are removed. This bands proximity to GPS L5, a
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low power signal, makes it less desirable. DME channel associations and pairings are
described in detail in the National Aviation Standard for VOR/DME/TACAN (FAA
1984). DME channels 49x-59x could be eliminated and free up 1010 MHz to 1020
MHz. This 10 MHz band is less desirable because of its proximity to 1030 MHz
ATCRBS. The third potential availability lies between 960 MHz and 977 MHz. This
17 MHz band lies between the bottom end of ARNS and the UAT at 978 MHz. It is
occupied by the DME portion of TACAN channels assigned to mobile TACAN, three
JTIDS channels, and one DME channel assigned to facility and equipment maintenance
on the ground. Frequencies adjacent to 960 MHz could potentially be affected by
systems outside the ARNS band. The effects of cell phone operations at 950-960 MHz
can have an effect on DME channels below 970 MHz (Electronic Communications
Committee, CEPT 2007). The UAT system operating at 978 MHz bounds the other
end of this potential window. UATs will exist on nearly every aircraft as the primary
means of transmitting and receiving ADS-B. They will also operate at nearly 800 sites
across the NAS as ADS-B GBTs. There seems to be a consensus that this band from
960-977 is the most likely choice for any addition to the ARNS band (STAR 2006) (Lo,
Pseudolite Alternatives for Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT)
2012) (ICAO 2005). The following sections of this thesis will consider the
performance of a UHARS like APNT signal in the 960-970 MHz band.
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Figure 18: ARNS Band Usage
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Spreading Codes and Chipping Rate
Locata utilizes a direct sequence bi-phase shift keying (DS-BPSK) spreading
code. The direct sequence codes (PRN codes) are the same codes used by the GPS with
the addition of codes to accommodate up to 200 unique channels on a LocataNet. The
chipping rate of Locata and UHARS code is ten times faster than the GPS. Increasing
the chipping rate to 10.23 Million chips per second spreads the signal wider but also
increases the theoretical accuracy of the code tracking delay lock loops in the receiver.
Because the ARNS band is quite crowded a high powered wide-band signal would be
more difficult to integrate. Reducing the chipping rate, at the expense of accuracy, is
one way to reduce the interference of an APNT signal on neighboring ARNS systems.
Changing the format of the spreading code, other than the chipping rate, was not
considered in this analysis.
The chipping rate of a DS-BPSK signal is related to the signal’s power spectrum
density (S) in Equation 1. Band pass filters at the transmitter and receiver can
generally mask all but the main center lobe. Therefore, the minimum “bandwidth” of
any signal is about twice the chipping rate. Figure 20 is a PSD plot of the UHARS
signal at the transmitter antenna. Reducing the chipping rate will make the lobes of this
plot taller and skinnier. The bold green line represents the masked signal when an 8pole 20 MHz band pass filter is applied. The masking filter minimally affects the
power contained in the main lobe of the signal but can reduce power transmitted by 60
dB only 10 MHz from the center frequency. The masking filter is derived from the
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band bass filter used in the UHARS demonstration manufactured by L-Com, model
number BPF24-809.

(1)

Figure 20: UHARS Transmitted Signal
The delay lock loop (DLL) of a receiver tracks the phase changes in the signal
generated with each chip. This method of “code tracking” is less precise than carrier
phase tracking but is more robust. UHARS 3D RMS accuracy was reduced from about
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18cm carrier solution to 25 cm code solution (Craig 2011). As chipping rate of the
code increases the duration of each chip is reduced and precision is improved. The
duration of each chip is converted to range when multiplied by c, the speed of light.
Equation 2 relates chipping rate and received SNR to DLL pseudorange error. Note
that TC is directly proportional to the standard deviation of DLL error.
(2)

Figure 20 illustrates the relationship between chipping rate, received signal strength,
and DLL accuracy. Error values in the plot are 95% RMS, or 2σ. UHARS receivers
generally receive -100 dBW to -130 dBW of power. In this plot, receiver correlator
spacing is set to 1 chip, received white noise PSD is set to -150 dBW/Hz, and the DLL
bandwidth is .005 Hz. At PC = -130 dBW, the DLL accuracy is reduced to 1.75 meters,
or doubled, if chipping rate is reduced to 5.115 MCps. Reducing chipping rate by as
much as ten times, to 1.023 MCps, may still provide enough ranging precision to meet
the 92.6 meter goal of APNT and significantly narrow the bandwidth of an APNT
signal.
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Figure 21: DLL Ranging Precision and Chipping Rate

TDMA and Receiver Dynamic Range
Figure 16 illustrates the TDMA scheme used by Locata and UHARS to
overcome the near far problem. Each LocataLite is assigned a 100µs N-slot during
every 1ms TDMA frame. During each subsequent 1ms TDMA frame the LocataLite
will transmit during a different N-slot based on a pseudo-random schedule. This
pseudo-random pattern ensures that clock errors between LocataLites would not
otherwise cause overlapping transmissions to occur repeatedly. The TDMA slot
assignments repeat every 200ms.
At a chipping rate of 10.23MCps, an entire 1023 chip PRN code is transmitted
in one 100µs N-slot. At a data rate of 100 bps, ten complete code epochs are received
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in the duration of each bit. The integer ratio of cycles to chips, chips to code epoch,
code epoch to TDMA slot, and TDMA slot to data bits is not mandatory in the design
of a receiver. If these integer relationships are altered by, for example, halving the
chipping rate so there are 511.5 chips per TDMA slot, the receiver acquisition and
tracking capabilities should be evaluated in future research.
By assigning each LocataLite on a subnet a unique TDMA slot, up to 10
LocataLites can be in the same geographic area and significantly varied ranges from the
user receiver and not interfere with each other. Because there is some cross correlation
between the PRN codes of each LocataLite, a receiver could misinterpret a PRN code if
its received signal is more than 23dB from other pseudolites. This 23dB separation
between cross correlation peaks could be increased to 33dB of separation by increasing
the code lengths to 10230 chips, as was done in the new GPS L5 signal (Enge 2003).
It is not unreasonable to imagine an aircraft flying only a few thousand feet above an
APNT pseudolite, or a range of about .5nmi. At .5nmi from pseudolite A the APNT
receiver would have trouble distinguishing pseudolite B if it was more than 8nmi away.
This would severely limit the service volume of each pseudolite and the number of
pseudolites required to cover all APNT zones. 33dB of separation might provide
20nmi maximum range but this is still unacceptable for APNT.
The cost of this TDMA scheme is accumulated power of the received signal at
the Locata receiver. Because the LocataLite is only transmitting 10% of the time, the
accumulated energy is 10% of a continuous transmission. In other words, to the
Locata receiver, a LocataLite transmitting 10W for 100µs of each ms appears to be
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transmitting at only 1W. This becomes a challenge when interference with neighboring
systems is considered. For example, a UAT on the ground broadcasts its entire
message during 5 to 10ms of each second. To the UAT, a LocataLite is transmitting at
10W for 20% of this time which is likely to cause enough interference to be considered
continuous transmission. A UAT must be capable of tolerating co-channel interference
of -86dBW if pulsed as a DME signal, or up to 3600 3.5µs pulse pairs per second, , but
only -131dBW if continuous (MILSTD-291C 1998). Increasing the duration of a
TDMA N-slot to 200µs and reducing the number of slots in a frame to five would
double the accumulated energy at the Locata receiver without adversely affecting
nearby UATs. It would, however, reduce the number of possible LocataLites in a
geographic subnet from 10 to 5.
Power & Service Volume
Transmitted power will have the greatest effect of any signal characteristic
considered in this thesis on the effective range, or service volume, of an APNT
pseudolite. LocataLites for commercial use are restricted to 1W transmission in the
2.4GHz ISM band. UHARS received a waiver to transit at up to 10W on the White
Sands range. The ARNS band places no blanket restrictions on transmission power.
The maximum transmission power levels of each system are uniquely defined to
prevent unwanted interference. Minimum transmission power is determined in order to
provide a guaranteed service volume for each system. This service volume will partly
determine how many pseudolites are required to cover all APNT zones.
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UHARS pseudolites transmit 10W at 2.414 and 2.465GHz. Testing at
Holloman indicated a service volume with a radius of approximately 30nmi and up to at
least 25,000 feet. Many of the legacy navigation aids in service today provide service
out to 130nmi. For ease of comparison, a service volume with a 40 nautical mile radius
up to 18,000 feet and 130nmi from 18,000 feet to 45,000 feet is considered.

Figure 19: Standard Service Volume-High
To increase the service volume of an APNT pseudolite power will have to
increase. A significant increase in service volume already comes from reducing the
carrier frequency of the navigation signal. The effective area of the receiver antenna is
related to the square of the carrier wavelength as shown in Equation 3.
(3)
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If transmitter power remained at 10W and

is reduced from 2414 MHz to 971 MHz,

the same power is received at 75nmi as was received at 30nmi. Received power, user
range, and carrier frequency are related in Equation 4.
(4)

To acquire and track a signal from a UHARS LocataLite, the minimum received
power for a UHARS receiver is approximately -130 dBW (Craig 2011). AGPS
receiver certified for precision approach use will acquire a signal with a minimum
power level of approximately -150dBW. This is a significant difference in receiver
sensitivity. Based on Equation 4, an improvement of 20dB in receiver sensitivity could
increase the range of the UHARS signal to over 200nmi without any increase in power
or modification to the signal. An increase in the sensitivity of Locata receivers for the
purpose of APNT could be studied in future work. This thesis assumes that any APNT
system modeled after Locata and the UHARS would have to demonstrate feasibility
without significant modification to receiver capabilities.
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Antennas and Filters
The antennas chosen for a new APNT system will affect the predicted service
volume of each pseudolite as well as their influence on other systems in the ARNS
band. The antenna pattern chosen for ground transmitters will likely be isotropic in the
horizontal plane but will concentrate power between the horizon and approximately 60
degrees above the horizon. Legacy navigation systems such as VOR and DME
generally do not provide reliable reception above approximately 40 degrees. Figure 23
illustrates the vertical antenna pattern of a commercially available broadband antenna
used for Mode-S squitter and ADS-B transmissions (dB Systems Inc. 2012). To be
conservative, an antenna with gain pattern that is isotropic in azimuth and uniformly
spread between -10 degrees below the horizon is applied. This results in a transmitter
gain of 2.3dB. A gain of 10dB or more could significantly increase the range of a
UHARS pseudolite and is not unrealistic, although a corresponding increase in
interference to nearby systems would also be felt. Because fixed navigational aids are
not power limited like satellites or LocataLites, antenna gain is more useful for
directing energy where it is desired rather than simply increasing effective range.
The antenna pattern chosen for the aircraft receiver in the UHARS
demonstration was a custom designed quadrifiliar helix antenna. A monopole antenna
or blade on the belly of an aircraft would have limited reception range in the vertical
axis. A patch antenna on the belly of the aircraft would severely limit the horizontal
range of the UHARS network. The custom helical antenna offered sufficient gain in
the vertical axis to receive pseudolite ranging signals below the aircraft without
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compromising horizontal gain. Reception of pseudolite signals below the aircraft is
important for maintaining good geometry when determining altitude. Because APNT
may rely on barometric altitude for vertical positioning a standard monopole antenna
may be sufficient. A study by RTCA on appropriate aircraft antennas for ADS-B UAT
usage determined that a 5/8 λ monopole antenna could provide approximately 5dB gain
in the horizontal plane (UPS Aviation Technologies 2001). While gain in the vertical
axis might be significantly less, a UHARS signal at 20W would only require a receiver
gain of -5dB to reach a pseudolite 55,000’ directly below it. The ability to use existing
antennas for dual purpose could simplify the installation of new APNT hardware on
aircraft. A receiver antenna with an isotropic gain of 5dB is assumed in this analysis.
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Figure 20: Ground Transmitter Antenna Gain
Adding a bandpass filter to any broadband signal will significantly reduce the
amount of interference received by neighboring systems. An APNT signal in the 960970 MHz range must be masked appropriately to avoid interference with systems below
960MHz or the UATs that operate at 978MHz. An APNT pseudolite broadcasting a
given signal will have a minimum standoff range from any UAT to avoid interference.
Because there will be over 800 ground based UATs and countless more airborne UATs
operating in the NAS, minimizing the standoff distance is important. Figure 24
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illustrates a potential APNT signal modeled after the UHARS and operating without a
bandpass filter. As power transmitted by the pseudolite is increased in the Y axis, the
effective range of the pseudolite increases on the X axis, but so does the minimum
standoff distance from a UAT to avoid interference. In this model the chipping rate is
reduced to 5.115MCps to narrow the signal. The TDMA slot is increased to 200ms to
increase the received code power at the pseudolite. The center frequency is placed at
971MHz. Lowering the center frequency may require concession from users outside
the ARNS band. Even with these modifications, an APNT pseudolite powered to
reach 130nmi would have to remain 20nmi from the nearest UAT; an impossible
requirement. Applying a bandpass filter can reduce this minimum separation to just a
few meters.
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Figure 21: Pseudolite-UAT Separation, No Filtering
Network Size and Performance
In 2012 the MITRE Corporation was funded to conduct a study on DME/DME
based RNAV coverage of CONUS (Niles, et al. 2012). The objective was to determine
if current DME sites provide sufficient coverage of CONUS airspace to meet RNAV
1.0 requirements. Where there are gaps in DME coverage or unnecessary sites existed
they were indicated. The methods used in this study could be applied to determine the
number and location of pseudolites necessary to cover all APNT Zones.
The first step in the MITRE study was to model DME/DME RNAV
requirements. RNAV 1.0 requires a 1-σ Horizontal Position Error (HPE) of .866nmi
(FAA 2005). A Horizontal DOP (HDOP) was assumed to be 2.82. Maximum User
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Range Error (URE) is then approximately .3nmi. For APNT, the requirement for 2-σ
HPE is 92.6m. If an HDOP of 2.82 is assumed, maximum URE is 16.3m. DME/DME
RNAV only requires two DME sites to determine a receiver position. A pseudolite
analysis should include three pseudolites or more in any position fix (≥4 if barometric
altitude is not incorporated). The sensitivity of coverage to the number of solutions
required was explored in 2010 by Sherman Lo, et al (Lo, Pseudolite Alternatives for
Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012). Interestingly, coverage
at 5000’ AGL (Zone 2) was not significantly improved when only two signals are
required. The mountainous areas of the western United States remain poorly covered in
either case. Use of a DME site is restricted to ≥3nmi, ≤130nmi and ≤40o elevation
angle. As a starting point, 130nmi maximum range can be modeled. The restrictions
on minimum user range and elevation angle can be lifted. The MITRE study modeled
Zone 3 cones over the busiest 65 of the 135 airports listed in the APNT CONOPS. A
complete pseudolite analysis should cover all 135 airports. 920 DME sites were
considered in the MITRE model. Because APNT Pseudolites could be most
conveniently placed at existing FAA sites a pseudolite coverage analysis should include
these 920 DME sites as well as any VORs located without DME. Finally, “users” were
modeled in a 4 nautical mile grid pattern over all of CONUS. The altitude of each user
was determined by the lower of 18,000’ MSL enroute, or the bottom of a Zone 3 cone
at the user’s location, taking into account minimum IFR altitudes of 1000’ or 2000’
AGL. Terrain masking effects that restrict line-of-sight between the DME site and user
were considered as they should be when evaluating APNT. The differences between
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the MITRE evaluation of DME for RNAV and pseudolites for APNT are summarized
in Table 5.
Table 5: DME RNAV vs Pseudolite APNT Constraints
Constraint

DME RNAV

Pseudolite APNT

65

135

User Spacing

4nmi

4nmi

Max. URE

555m

16.4m

2

3

2.82

2.82

3-130nmi according to
receiver height
40o

0-130nmi according to
receiver height above ground
90o

18,000’ enroute

Zone 2 enroute

Airports with Zone 3

Min. # Transmitters
Max. PDOP
Service Volume
Max. Elevation Angle
Min. Receiver
Altitude

>1000’ AGL in Zone 3

>500’ AGL in Zone 3

Given the above constraints, each user’s location was evaluated to determine if
a valid DME/DME position fix would be possible. The current DME network provided
a valid fix to 98% of CONUS airspace. Varying the minimum altitude used in a Zone 3
approach up to 2000’AGL from 500’ AGL improved coverage to 98.33%. When the
DME network was evaluated assuming repair to all low altitude DMEs and repair to all
restricted DMEs, coverage increased to 99.14%.
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To determine the size requirements of a future DME RNAV system, MITRE
modified their model to require 100% coverage of CONUS and asked the question:
How many DME sites will be required and where should they be placed? 920 DME
sites, 4572 public airports, and 258 additional new sites were considered in a Voronoi
process. After two passes a minimum network of DMEs that included new sites, and
the removal of unnecessary sites was determined. A total of 491 sites were required to
cover all of CONUS if Zone 3 service does not go below 1000’ AGL. An additional 26
sites were required to expand Zone 3 coverage to 500’ AGL. Although many ILS
intercept altitudes are well above 1000’ AGL, an analysis of APNT pseudolites should
require coverage as low as 500’ AGL. The APNT requirement for three pseudorange
measurements to determine a fix could have a significant impact on the number of sites
required for pseudolite coverage. Increasing the number of Zone 3 airports will also
increase the number of pseudolites required for complete coverage.
Tropospheric and Multipath Errors
UHARS and other pseudolite signals propagate through the Troposphere for
significantly greater ranges than a GNSS. Because light travels slower through the
troposphere (especially wet troposphere) the ranging signal is delayed and interpreted
by the receiver as a longer than actual range. Pseudolites benefit from not having to
transit the ionosphere which can be significantly more difficult to model. Locata has
incorporated a tropospheric error modeling algorithm that was first applied in
simulation at AFIT in 2003 (Bouska 2003). This model was used in the UHARS
demonstration at White Sands in 2011.
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To accurately model and account for tropospheric errors several variables are
considered. Most of these variables will already be known by any pseudolite once a
position fix is determined. Additional measurements are required at each LocataLite
for atmospheric pressure, air temperature, and relative humidity. Collecting the same
additional measurements at the receiver will benefit the user. Fortunately these data are
easy to collect on the ground and are already collected at many of the proposed
pseudolite sites.
If not corrected for, tropospheric delay could induce as much as 120m of error
over 130nmi into each pseudorange measurement. The model derived in Bouska’s
thesis has been improved upon in Locata and UHARS work. Locata networks today
can reduce residual tropospheric error to about 1% of actual. A worst case estimate for
residual tropospheric error is then assumed to be 1 meter or less at 130nmi, or about 4
parts per million. The current methods applied to UHARS and Locata are compatible
with the APNT solution.
Multipath error is mitigated in Locata Networks with the addition of a second
carrier frequency and antenna at each LocataLite. The two antennas are placed
approximately 10 meters apart at each UHARS LocataLite. For the longer ranges
required by APNT, this separation might be increased. Each antenna transmits the two
carrier frequencies, requiring four distinct PRN coded signals at each LocataLite. In
the crowded, or indoor environments typical of Locata installations multipath can have
a significant impact on availability when destructive interference causes receivers to
lose lock. Thoughtful installation of pseudolite antennas could offset the need for
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multiple ranging signals from each pseudolite. Further research on this topic is
necessary. Multipath error can be bounded as a function of code chip duration and
correlator spacing in the receiver as shown in Equation 5 (Misra and Enge 2001). This
is hardly a consolation because a signal with a chipping rate of 10.23MCps like the
UHARS could see multipath error as large as 45 meters.
(5)
A Proposed Signal and Predicted Performance
The sections above describe several variables in the UHARS signal that could
be modified to meet APNT requirements. MATLAB was used to efficiently
manipulate these variables and to determine the effective range and ranging accuracy of
any proposed pseudolite signal. Equations 1, 2, 4, and 5 were used to model the signal.
The CDMA and TDMA patterns of Locata were not significantly changed. Table 6
lists the variables used to estimate performance of an APNT signal. Table 7 lists the
outputs of the model.
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Table 6: Proposed Signal Variables
Variable

UHARS

Proposed Value

10.23 MHz

10.23MHz

2241 & 2465 MHz

971.85 MHz

10.23 MCps

5.115MCps

Code Length

1023

1023

TDMA Slot Duration

100µs

100µs

Data Bit Rate

100

100

Transmitted Power

10W

20W

Transmitter Antenna Gain

2.3dB

Receiver Antenna Gain

5.162dB

User Range

15 nmi

130 nmi

Transmission Mask

20MHz Bandpass

6MHz Bandpass

N0 – Noise background
Maximum PDOP

-150dBW/Hz
2.838

1

Max Correlator Spacing
Minimum Received Code
Power

2.838

~ -135dBW
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-132dBW

Table 7: Estimated Signal Accuracy
Measure

Performance Value
.74 meters

95% RMS DLL Error
Residual Tropospheric Error

2 meters

Local Timing Synchronization Error

.6 meters

(Single TimeLoc hop)

6.3 meters

95% RMS Position Accuracy
(

)

The model also included an analysis of received signal by other systems in the
ARNS band. Each system has a specified level of interference it’s receivers must be
able to tolerate. DME, UAT, and 1030 ATCRBS, and JTIDS each specify
approximately -130dBW continuous co-channel interference. Each system also
specifies a minimum receiver rejection level for out of band interference. If a 4MHz
wide band is assumed, the maximum received PSD for any system is -196dBW/Hz.
The model was run at varying center frequencies, chipping rates, transmitted power
levels and user ranges to determine the effects on each neighboring system. The
values above produced a signal that meets the 92.6m accuracy requirement and appears
to fit within the ARNS band. Figure 25 shows the received PSD of a proposed APNT
signal at three different center frequencies. The solid line PSD plots represent the
power arriving at a receiving antenna at 100m from the transmitter. Interference levels
drop as the receiver and offending transmitter are separated further. A band pass filter
has been applied at the transmitter, but no receiver filtering is accounted for. A rough
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estimate of acceptable interference level is the horizontal dashed line at -196dBW/Hz.
-196dBW/Hz is the PSD of -130dBW within a 4MHz band. If the PSD plot of a
proposed signal is above this line at any given frequency then interference may be a
problem. The vertical bars represent each ARNS system channel in use and do not
imply power or bandwidth occupied. The dashed lines of 1030 ATCRBS and GPS L5
illustrate the broadband nature of those signals. Figures 18 and 25 can be used in
conjunction to evaluate a more desirable center frequency for pseudolite APNT. Note
the proximity of the proposed APNT signal at 971MHz to the UAT transmitter at
978MHz. This is an area for further study if 971MHz is chosen. The UAT signal is
only modulated at 1Mbps, making it a fairly narrow signal. The receiver mask applied
to a UAT transmitter is -20dB down at +/- 1MHz and -5dB down at +/- 2MHz. UAT
rejection ratios specified are similar. Applying the receiver rejection ratio to the model
of the proposed APNT signal yields only -142dBW of received interference at the UAT
from a pseudolite 100m away.
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Figure 22: Co-Channel Interference Threshold
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research
AFIT was tasked by the FAA to answer the question: Could a pseudolite system
similar to Locata and the UHARS meet APNT requirements by 2025? The question
was answered through a systems engineering approach. A model of the proposed
signal was built to evaluate its performance and enable modification for analysis of
alternatives. Chapter III of this thesis describes the process used to connect NextGen
OIs to APNT performance requirements and the pillars of APNT described in the
APNT CONOPS. This process was indifferent to the technology or design of the
APNT source chosen. Instead, it answers the question: Will the performance
requirements laid out for a future APNT source meet NextGen Operational
Improvements? Chapter IV takes a close look at the architecture of Locata and the
UHARS to determine how UHARS could meet those APNT requirements.
63 operational improvements related to navigation, positioning, and surveillance
were matched against APNT performance requirements. Nearly half of those OIs will
not be fully enabled by APNT given the performance requirements and scope of APNT
laid out in the CONOPs. The OIs that are not met relate to increasing capacity in
terminal areas, providing access to secondary airports, positioning and surveillance on
the ground, and flexibility in the terminal environment. If the threshold for accuracy is
185 meters, capacity would not be improved in many areas. Capacity is dependent on
spacing and spacing is limited by surveillance capability. To meet or exceed current
spacing minimums, APNT must support 3nmi separation by providing 92.6m accuracy.
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An unexpected GPS outage would require significant workload increase on the part of
controllers and aircrew to reposition aircraft to safe separation distances. If 92.6 meters
is achieved, then surveillance performance will meet that of ATCRBS and ADS-B. A
seamless transition from GPS to APNT is then possible in the event of GPS outage.
APNT shortfalls are then the product of lack of coverage and reliance on ILS for
recovery in low ceilings and visibility. Limiting APNT Zone 2 to 5000’ AGL will
restrict access to many secondary airports. The FAA should consider increasing the
number of Zone 3 space, or potentially adding a fourth zone that would extend
guaranteed APNT service to 1000’ AGL over secondary airports. Locata technology
has the flexibility to allow for an infinite number of pseudolites within the NAS, given
no more than 50 are within view of a receiver at any time. Low powered pseudolites
could be placed on the ground at busy airports to provide APNT positioning on the
ground. I should be noted here that the cost of meeting or exceeding current RNAV
standards with a APNT system may be prohibitive and unnecessary. As an alternative
to GNSS, APNT, at a minimum, must allow safe recovery of aircraft in the event of
GNSS outage. The cost benefit analysis may reveal that meeting all of the APNT
pillars and NextGen OIs is not the prudent choice.
The APNT is not being designed as a time distribution service. TimeLoc is not
suited to provide time synchronization over long ranges, meaning a UHARS derived
APNT source would rely on an outside timing synchronization. Providing robust
timing to a pseudolite network was explored by Lo, Akos, and Denis in 2012 (Lo, Akos
and Dennis 2012). Their work shows that antennas designed to reject interference and
jamming could provide a reliable link to space based time sources. This method is
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possibly affordable enough to provide reliable timing to pseudolites but jam resistant
antennas may be cost prohibitive for many other users in need of a precision timing
source. Given the explosion in creative use of the GPS for both position and time, it
seems shortsighted to limit APNT design to only servicing well equipped aircraft above
1000’ AGL.
A modified UHARS signal was proposed in Chapter IV that will provide better
than 92.6m positioning accuracy at ranges up to 130nmi. With a modest power
increase to 20W and a reduction in code chipping rate, the UHARS signal can match
the service volume of today’s navigation beacons and provide a position reference
accurate to better than 10 meters. This level of accuracy allows for some design
flexibility. For example, poor geometry and PDOP or network timing errors would not
immediately push accuracy out of limits and requirements could be relaxed. Increasing
power transmitted is not likely to significantly reduce the number of pseudolites
required to cover all APNT Zones. Terrain masking and service at extreme elevation
angles is more often a limiting factor. An analysis similar to that conducted by MITRE
in 2012 could determine the most efficient location of pseudolites to cover all APNT
Zones.
The modified UHARS signal could potentially fit into the crowded ARNS band
provided. An infrequently used band from 960-977 MHz exists that could fit a well
masked wide band navigation signal. The proposed signal is shown to be below the
allowable interference threshold of its closest neighbor, the UATs used for ADS-B,
when separated by 100 meters. The practicality of building transmission sites in the
real world will have to be studied. Over 800 ground based UATs are planned
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throughout the NAS. Nearly all aircraft equipped for ADS-B will operate a UAT.
Antenna choices and proximity of transmitters should be evaluated in future work. Any
channel chosen within the ARNS will have its list of challenges but 971 MHz appears
to be the least complicated.
Recommendations for Future Research

The first priority for future research should be a detailed service volume
analysis similar to the DME study performed by MITRE in 2012. The input variables
and their differences are described in Table 5. Chapter IV describes a candidate signal
that could provide a service volume similar to VOR and DME sites. This signal can
provide a starting point to determine if pseudolites placed at current VOR and DME
sites would provide adequate coverage of all APNT Zones. Where significant gaps
exist, the number and location of new signals required can be determined. Based on the
shortfalls of APNT found in this thesis, future research could focus on the expansion of
APNT Zones to the surface or an increase in the number of Zone 3 cones for
approaches to secondary airports. The cost of expanding APNT service in numbers of
pseudolites is an important factor.
Related to this task of evaluating pseudolite coverage, would be a systems
engineering approach to expanding APNT service for non-aviation use. Positioning,
and timing uses for GPS far exceed those originally required by the DoD. Thoughtful,
flexible design has allowed the commercial benefits of GPS to far exceed its cost. If
this approach is taken to APNT it may be applied to highway navigation, mobile
communication, and time distribution on the ground. Research would attempt to
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answer the following questions. Could a Locata system be implemented on a national
scale with large numbers of low powered pseudolites with service volumes similar to
cellular phones? Could such a pseudolite network provide the integrity required for
safety-of-life applications?
The second priority for future research should be a detailed simulation of
candidate signals. Three channels for APNT were proposed in this thesis and roughly
modeled against neighboring ARNS band signals. An APNT signal centered at
971MHz must not interfere with the UATs broadcasting at 978MHz, the DME channels
that begin at 980 MHz, or the JTIDS channels as low as 970MHz. Broadcasting
experimental signals in the ARNS band is a complex task. Simulation of the APNT
signal as well as the UAT signals for interference analysis may be within the scope of a
follow-on thesis.
A high fidelity model of any APNT signal might include pseudolite transmitter
and receiver design. Recall that Locata was modeled from the GPS to facilitate
integrated receiver design. The FAA will likely require that APNT receivers be
installed on all aircraft that wish to operate in controlled airspace. Other users of
APNT, especially non-aviation and non-commercial user would benefit from small,
inexpensive receivers. Given a candidate APNT signal, could a single receiver be
designed to track both APNT and GNSS signals? Smart phones, small unmanned
aircraft, personal watches, and light aircraft would all benefit from compact,
inexpensive designs. Which antennas would be well suited to receive a given APNT
signal? Addition and certification of antennas on aircraft can be costly. Future
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research might explore the possibility of using a single antenna for UAT
communication at 978MHz and APNT reception at 971MHz.
A third area of future research focuses on pseudolite clock synchronization. As
discussed in this thesis, TimeLoc via line-of-sight transmissions is not a viable solution.
Technology exists that could potentially make satellite based time references a robust
and viable option (Lo, Akos and Dennis, Time Source Options for Alternate
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012). LocataLites (and UHARS
pseudolites) rely on 1Hz updates of a GPS time reference at the Master pseudolite.
Any error in the Master pseudolite’s reference to true GPS or drift between updates is
irrelevant to the positioning accuracy of the pseudolite network. Rather, positioning
accuracy is dependent on the network’s ability to synchronize clocks via TimeLoc.
Modification of the LocataLite architecture to accurately synchronize each pseudolite
independently to GPS or other GNSS should be explored. Pseudolite clock correction
to better than 3ns would contribute less than a meter to URE. Based on signal
performance estimates in this thesis, that is well within the performance margin
provided.
Integrity is important attributes that should be further studied. Integrity in the
GPS is partly inherent in the fact that it is space based, controlled and monitored by the
DOD. Primarily, integrity is based on RAIM predictions and measurements. RAIM
requires an over determined solution that is easily available from the GPS but would
require a significant increase in the number of pseudolites installed over the CONUS.
Methods to replace RAIM as the primary means of integrity checking should be
researched by the APNT team. Increasing the data rate of the navigation message may
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allow for public key encryption. Monitoring of the ranging signal from each pseudolite
and broadcasting an integrity flag on a separate channel is also a possibility.
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Appendix
A. PNT Performance Requirements
Precision-based Navigation, ADS-B Surveillance and Timing Performance In Support of Trajectory-based Operations
Navigation

Surveillance

(>99.0% Availability)
(>99.9% Availability)
Accuracy Containment Separation
NACp
NIC
Aircraft State

Leader/
Follower

1
2

3,4

Flight Operation
Parked

(95%)

(10- 7 )

Taxi-out

Visual

Visual

Low-vis (300-600 RVR)
1m
Low-vis (<300 RVR)
1m
Takeoff
Visual
High Density Airport
Visual

3m
3m
Visual
Visual

x

7

x

8

x

10

x

11,12

x

14,15

x

16

x

(10- 7 )

0.05 nm (8)2 0.6 nm (6)2

1,200 feet 3 121 m (8)
1,200 feet
121 m (8)
Visual
0.05 nm (8)
Visual
0.05 nm (8)

0.2
0.2
0.6
0.6

GNSS

nm (7)
nm (7)
nm (6)
nm (6)

GNSS
GNSS

(+/-) 1 minute
GBAS
GBAS

(+/-) 3 minutes 4
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+5/-15) minutes
(+/-) 1 minute

GNSS
GNSS

3m

3 nm

0.05 nm (8)

0.6 nm (6)

GNSS

GBAS

(+/-) 3 minutes 4

3m

3 nm

0.05 nm (8)

0.6 nm (6)

GNSS

GBAS

(+/-) 3 minutes 4

Climb to Cleanup6
Departure/Climb
Top of Climb
High Density Airspace
Top of Climb

0.3 nm
1 nm
0.3 nm
0.3 nm
0.3 nm

0.6 nm
2 nm
0.6 nm
0.6 nm
0.6 nm

3
3
3
3
3

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

Top of Climb (Merge)

0.3 nm

0.6 nm

3 nm

Cruise 8

10 nm
4 nm
2 nm

20 nm
8 nm
4 nm

20 nm
10 nm
5 nm

High Density Airspace
1 nm
Top of Descent
2 nm
High Density Airspace
1 nm
Arrival
1 nm
High Density Airspace
0.3 nm
Approach
Initial Approach Fix
Final Approach Fix
Runway Threshold
High Density Airports
Metering Fix
Initial Approach Fix

2 nm
4 nm
2 nm
2 nm
0.6 nm

3 nm1 5
5 nm
3 nm
3 nm
3 nm

<92.6 m (8) <0.2 nm (7)
<308 m (7) <1 nm (5)
<92.6 m (8) <0.2 nm (7)
<308 m (7) <1 nm (5)
<92.6 m (8) <0.2 nm (7)

Stable Approach Point 9
Final Approach Fix
Runway Threshold
Single Runway
LNAV
0.3 nm

nm
nm
nm
nm
nm

nm (8)
nm (8)
nm (8)
nm (8)
nm (8)

nm (6)
nm (6)
nm (6)
nm (6)
nm (6)

GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS

0.05 nm (8)

0.6 nm (6)

GNSS

(+/-) 1 minute 7

0.1 nm (7)
0.1 nm (7)
<308 m (7)

1 nm (5)
1 nm (5)
<1 nm (5)

GNSS
GNSS
GNSS

(+/-) 2-5 minutes
(+/-) 2-5 minutes
(+/-) 2-5 minutes

GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS

(+/-) 1-3 minutes
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+1/-3) minutes
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+/-) 30 seconds
(+/-) 30 seconds
(+/-) 30 seconds
(+/-) 20 seconds
(+/-) 20 seconds

GNSS

(+/-) 1 minute
(+5/-15) minutes
(+5/-15) minutes
(+1/-5) minutes
(+1/-5) minutes

GBAS

(+/-) 12-18 seconds
(+/-) 20 seconds
(+/-) 3-4 seconds
(+/-) 3-4 seconds
(+/-) 3-4 seconds
0.6 nm

RNP (AR)
0.3-0.1 nm1 4 0.3-0.1 nm1 4
LPV
16m/4m
40m/50m
LPV-200
16m/4m
40m/35m
GLS Cat-I
16m/4m
40m/10m
GLS Cat-III
16m/4m
40m/10m
High Density Airports
14,15

RTP1

1m

Low-vis (<300 RVR)
5,13
6,13

Visual

Time Performance

GNSS PNT
(99.0 - 99.999%)

1m

Low-vis (300-600 RVR)

5

(95%)

Positioning

3 nm
3
3
3
3
3

nm
nm
nm
nm
nm

0.05 nm (8)

0.6 nm (6)

GNSS

SBAS

TBD1 0
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD

TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD

GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS

SBAS
SBAS
SBAS
GBAS
GBAS

Parallel Runways 1 1
> 4,300 feet Separation 0.3 nm
0.6 nm
2 nm IPA1 2 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
GNSS
SBAS
3,400 - 4,300 feet
16m/4m
40m/10m
2 nm IPA
121 m (8)
0.2 nm (7)
GNSS
SBAS
2,500 - 3,400 feet
16m/4m
40m/10m
2 nm IPA
121 m (8)
0.2 nm (7)
GNSS
GBAS
1,600 - 2,500 feet
16m/4m
40m/10m 2.5 nm DPA
TBD
TBD
GNSS
GBAS
750 - 1,600 feet
16m/4m
40m/10m 2.5 nm DPA
TBD
TBD
GNSS
GBAS
Taxi-in
Visual
Visual
Visual
0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
GNSS
(+/-) 3 minutes
Low-vis (300-600 RVR)
1m
3m
1,200 feet
121 m (8)
0.2 nm (7)
GNSS
GBAS
(+/-) 3 minutes
Low-vis (<300 RVR)
1m
3m
1,200 feet
121 m (8)
0.2 nm (7)
GNSS
GBAS
(+/-) 3 minutes
Notes: 1. Required Time Performance (RTP) has been created by the JPDO TBO Study Team to represent performance goals until
confirmed by research and represents a range of time values.
2. Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) and Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) values provided
Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL) in ( ).
3. Requires research. Assumes 20 nm/hour taxi speed and being able to detect another aircraft/vehicle by ADS-B
and stopping to avoid collision.
4. In low-vis conditions, capacity is reduced and RTP increases to compensate for slower surface movement.
5. Centerline guidance required for takeoff roll.
Operations <300 RVR are expected to be possible with enhanced vision that produces the equivalent of 300 RVR visibility.
6. Flight segment used to transition from liftoff to start of climb route where gear and flaps are retracted.
7. Increased precision in RTP required to merge into an overhead flow.
8. Includes oceanic and offshore operations.
9. Stable approach point is where the aircraft is fully configured and slowed to appropriate speed and the
pilot is prepared to land. In TBO, this is a point where time changes are not made.
10. Surveillance values dependent on research to mirror ADS-B In requirements for the procedure
11. TBO envisions 2,500 feet lateral runway separation to be an independed arrival stream and any less
runway spacing is a dependent arrival stream between the two runways
12. Independent Parallel Approach (IPA); Dependent Parallel Approach (DPA)
13. Operational requirements are defined for total system accuracy, which is dominated by flight technical error
and position accuracy for the operation is negligible.
14. Containment for RNP AR is specified as a total system requirement; value is representative of current approvals.
15. Assessment of approval for 3 nm separation for NACp 92.6 m and NIC <0.2 nm not yet completed (August 2011)
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B. OI Shortfalls Listed

JPDO
Identifier

Targeted
NextGen
Capability
For 225

APNT
Function

Impact

APNT
Supported?

Provides
position
to GA
aircraft
for ADSB
positioni
ng for
more
direct
routing
through
busy
terminal
area
airspace
310

1

2

APNT Gap

Cost may
prohibit
acces to
GA

Performanc
e Zone

Name

Description

Benefits

Improved GA
Access to
Traverse
Terminal
Areas

This Operational Improvement
(OI) results in increased access
to busy airspace, such as Class
B, for General Aviation (GA)
operators. More direct routing
for GA operators is facilitated
through improved access to
traverse busy terminal area
airspace via the continued use
and possible expansion of
Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
Flyways as well as by the
utilization of Automatic
Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS-B)
technologies. Typically, GA
operators have to fly "around"
busy airspace, with associated
penalties in efficiency. With
this OI a GA flight is more likely
to transit through busy
airspace when the desired
flight path crosses that
airspace. Major benefits are
access and efficiency. This OI
primarily affects
arrival/departure airspace and
En Route airspace.
Roles/Responsibilities: Based
on the initial planned solution
(static corridors), there are no
changes in
roles/responsibilities.

Increased
efficiency
Increased
accessibility
Enhanced
user-preferred
trajectories

3

106

Solution
Set
Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

Service
ATCSeparation
Assurance

311

Provides
position
to
continue
RNAV
and RNP
to
continue
more
efficient
aircraft
trajector
ies for
repeatab
le and
predicta
ble
navigati
on

Increase
Capacity and
Efficiency
Using Area
Navigation
(RNAV) and
Required
Navigation
Performance
(RNP)

1

2

d

1,3

107

Both RNAV and RNP will
enable more efficient aircraft
trajectories. RNAV and RNP
combined with airspace
changes, increase airspace
efficiency and capacity.
RNAV and RNP will permit the
flexibility of point-to-point
operations and allow for the
development of routes,
procedures, and approaches
that are more efficient and
free from the constraints and
inefficiencies of the groundbased NAVAIDS. This capability
can also be combined with an
Instrument Landing System
(ILS), to improve the transition
onto an ILS final approach and
to provide a guided missed
approach. Consequently, RNAV
and RNP will enable safe and
efficient procedures and
airspace that address the
complexities of the terminal
operation through repeatable
and predictable navigation.
These will include the ability to
implement curved path
procedures that can address
terrain, and noise-sensitive
and/or special-use airspace.
Terminal and en route
procedures will be designed
for more efficient spacing and
will address complex
operations.

* Improved
efficiency

Initiate
Trajectory
Based
Operation
s

Airspace
Manageme
nt

317

Will
provide
position
to
enable
navigati
on to
navigate
to ILS
final
approac
h course
and
missed
approac
h
procedu
res

Low
Visibility/Ceili
ng Approach
Operations

2

2

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent, ILS
required

The ability to complete
approaches in low
visibility/ceiling conditions is
improved for aircraft equipped
with some combination of
navigation derived from
augmented GNSS or ILS and
other cockpit-based
technologies or combinations
of cockpit-based technologies
and ground infrastructure.
The ability to complete
approaches in low
visibility/ceiling conditions is
improved for aircraft equipped
with some combination of
navigation derived from
augmented GNSS or ILS and
Head-up Display (HUD), EFVS,
SVS, advanced vision system
and other cockpit-based
technologies that combine to
improve human
performance. Cockpit-based
technologies allow instrument
approach procedure access
with reduced requirements on
ground-based navigation and
airport infrastructure. Due to
onboard avionics airport
access is maintained in low
visibility/ceiling conditions.

3

108

To Be
Determined

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

Navigation

327

x

Provides
position
informat
ion for
ADS-B in
real time
for
surveilla
nce and
automati
on.

2

1

Provide
position
to
ground
based
automati
on to
provide
conflict
free
time
based
metering
solutions
330

1

1

Not
provided
on surface

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent

Full Surface
Traffic
Management
with
Conformance
Monitoring

Operational Improvement

Time-Based
Metering in
the Terminal
Environment

Aircraft are time-based
metered inside the terminal
environment, enhancing
efficiency through the optimal
use of terminal airspace and
surface capacity. ANSP
automation develops
trajectories and allocates timebased slots for various points
(as needed) within the
terminal environment,
applying RNAV route data and
leveraging enhanced
surveillance, data
communications, and closely
spaced parallel, converging,
and intersecting runway
capabilities (where applicable).

S

3, S

This OI extends current
metering capabilities into the
terminal environment and
furthers the pursuit of end-toend metering and trajectorybased operations. It also
supports capabilities designed
to expand the use of terminal
separation standards in
transition airspace.
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Increased
airport
efficiency
Enhanced
surface safety
Improved
shared
situational
awareness
Decreased
emissions and
airport noise
levels
Increased
Efficiency
Increased
Capacity

Increase
Arrivals/D
epartures
at High
Density
Airports

TMSynchroniza
tion

Increase
Arrivals/D
epartures
at High
Density
Airports

TMSynchroniza
tion

331

334

x

Provides
position
to
update
Metropl
ex
scheduli
ng
automati
on to
optimize
runway
and
surface
moveme
nt
Provides
position
to
equippe
d aircraft
onboard
displays
and
alerting
systems
for
indepen
dent
convergi
ng
runways
to
continue
VMC
departur
e and
arrival
rates

2

2

2

2

Not
provided
on surface

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent if ILS
is
required

Improved
Management
of
Arrival/Surfac
e/Departure
Flow
Operations

This Operational Improvement
(OI) integrates advanced
Arrival/Departure flow
management with advanced
Surface operation functions to
improve overall airport
capacity and efficiency. Air
Navigation Service Provider
(ANSP) automation uses arrival
and departure-scheduling
tools and four dimensional
trajectory (4DT) agreements to
flow traffic at high-density
airports

Improved
efficiency
Reduced fuel
burn, airport
noise, and
emissions

Increase
Arrivals/D
epartures
at High
Density
Airports

TMSynchroniza
tion

Independent
Converging
Approaches in
IMC

This Operational Improvement
(OI) enables maintaining Visual
Meteorological Condition
(VMC) arrival and departure
rates in Instrument
Meteorological Conditions
(IMC) through use of onboard
displays and alerting for
independent converging
runways. Using precision
navigation, cooperative
surveillance, and onboard
algorithms and displays allows
the reduction of lateral
separation requirements for
converging runway operations
in IMC. Includes independent
approaches to converging
runways that are centerline
distances greater than 2500 ft.
The implementation of this OI
is strongly dependent on when
an airline decides this is
important and steps forward
to advocate for it.

0

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

ATCSeparation
Assurance

3, S

3

110

340

341

x

x

Provides
position
to ADS-B
for self
separati
on.
Accuracy
and
timeline
ss is
improve
d over
tradition
al
surface
MLAT.

Provides
position
to ADS-B
for self
separati
on.
Accuracy
and
timeline
ss is
improve
d over
tradition
al
surface
MLAT.

2

1

Not
provided
on surface

Provide
Surface
Situation to
Pilots, Service
Providers and
Vehicle
Operators for
Near-ZeroVisibility
Surface
Operations
S

Limited
Simultaneous
Runway
Occupancy

2

1

Not
provided
on surface

Aircraft and surface vehicle
positions are displayed to
aircraft, vehicle operators, and
air navigation service providers
(ANSP) to provide situational
awareness in restricted
visibility conditions, increasing
efficiency of surface
movement. Surface movement
is guided by technology such
as moving map displays,
enhanced vision sensors,
synthetic vision systems,
Ground Support Equipment
and a Cooperative Surveillance
System. Aircraft and surface
vehicle position will be sensed
and communicated utilizing
systems such as Cockpit
Display of Traffic Information
(CDTI) and Automatic
Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS-B)
Runway capacity is increased
through the allowance of more
than one aircraft on the
runway, at a given time, for
specific situations.
The expected use is to relax
some of the present
procedures/rules, thereby
allowing an aircraft to land
while another aircraft is in the
process of exiting the runway
onto a taxiway, or allowing an
aircraft to enter the runway
while another aircraft is in the
process of departing from that
runway.

S

111

Improved
situational
awarenessEnh
anced
safetyEnhance
d efficiency

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

ATCSeparation
Assurance

Increased
capacity

Increase
Arrivals/D
epartures
at High
Density
Airports

ATCSeparation
Assurance

348

x

Provides
required
perform
ance
criteria
for less
than 3
mile
separati
on
standard
s in
dense
terminal
areas

Reduce
Separation High Density
Terminal Less
Than 3-miles

1

1

Provides
position
to ADS-B
for self
separati
on
359

363

x

x

1

Provides
position
for
equippe
d aircraft
for
merging,
passing
or
crossing
of other
traffic.
Provides

1

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to support
<3 nm
separatio
n

1

Solution
alternativ
es do not
support
Oceanic
service

2

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent if ILS
is
required

Metroplex airspace capacity is
increased through
implementing separation
procedures for conducting
separation with less than 3miles between arrival and
departure routes in a high
density environment.

Increased
capacity

Increase
Arrivals/D
epartures
at High
Density
Airports

ATCSeparation
Assurance

Increased
efficiency

Initiate
Trajectory
Based
Operation
s

ATCSeparation
Assurance

Increased
efficiency

Increase
Arrivals/D
epartures
at High
Density
Airports

ATCSeparation
Assurance

3

SelfSeparation
Airspace Oceanic

1

Delegated
Separation Complex
Procedures

1,3

112

This Operational Improvement
increases metroplex airspace
capacity and supports super
density airport operations.
Enhanced surveillance and
data processing provides faster
update rates to allow reduced
separation.
Oceanic user efficiency and Air
Navigation Service Provider
(ANSP) productivity are
improved through selfseparation operations in
designated oceanic airspace
for capable aircraft.

In Air Navigation Service
Provider (ANSP)-managed
airspace, the ANSP delegates
separation responsibilities to
capable aircraft to improve
operator routing, enhance
operational efficiency, or
increase ANSP productivity.

position
for
conflict
detectio
n and
alerting

383

Provides
position
to ADSB.
Accuracy
and
timeline
ss is
improve
d over
tradition
al
surface
MLAT.

Improved
Runway
Safety
Situational
Awareness for
Controllers

1

1

Not
provided
on surface

3, S

113

At large airports, current
controller tools provide
surface displays and can alert
controllers when aircraft taxi
into areas where a runway
incursion could
result. Additional groundbased capabilities will be
developed to improve runway
safety that include expansion
of runway surveillance
technology (i.e., ASDE-X) to
additional airports,
deployment of low cost
surveillance for medium-sized
airports , improved runway
markings, and initial controller
taxi conformance monitoring
capabilities. These groundbased tools will provide a
range of capabilities to help
improve runway safety for
medium- to large-sized
airports.

*Increased
safety

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

ATCAdvisory

384

386

x

Provides
position
to ADS-B
for self
separati
on.
Accuracy
and
timeline
ss is
improve
d over
tradition
al
surface
MLAT.

Provides
position
in
mountai
nous
areas
where
radar
coverage
is limited
for both
navigati
on and
surveilla
nce

Improve
Runway
Safety
Situational
Awareness for
Pilots

2

1

Not
provided
on surface

3,S

Expanded
Radar-like
Services to
Secondary
Airports

1

2

APNT
CONOPs
only
supports
135
busiest
airports,
RADAR
like
coverage
not
available
below
5000'AGL

3

Runway safety operations are
improved by providing pilots
with improved awareness of
their location on the airport
surface as well as runway
incursion alerting
capabilities. To help minimize
pilot disorientation on the
airport surface, a surface
moving map display with
ownship position will be
available. Both groundbased (e.g., RWSL) and
cockpit-based runway
incursion alerting capabilities
will also be available to alert
pilots when it's unsafe to enter
the runway.
Expanded capacity is available
in Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC) at additional
secondary airports. Expanded
delivery of radar-like coverage
with surveillance alternatives
such as Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
coverage, combined with
other radar sources, and with
an expansion of
communication coverage
provides equipped aircraft
with radar-like services to
secondary airports.
Equipped aircraft
automatically receive airborne
broadcast traffic information.
Surface traffic information is
also available at select nontowered satellite airports.
Enhanced surveillance

114

*Increased
safety

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

ATCAdvisory

Improved
safety
Expanded
ANSP services
Enhanced
surveillance
coverage
Enhanced
search and
rescue
coordination

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

ATCSeparation
Assurance

coverage in areas of
mountainous terrain where
radar coverage is limited,
especially to small airports,
enables ANSP to provide radarlike services to equipped
aircraft. This capability
enhances alerting and
emergency services beyond
normal radar coverage areas.

Provides
position
for a
transitio
n from
localizer
guidance
to climb
navigati
on for
turning
procedu
res
(SIDS)
388

Low
Visibility/Ceili
ng Takeoff
Operations

2

1

Not
provided
on surface

Leverages some combination
of HUD, EFVS, SVS, or
advanced vision system
capabilities to allow
appropriately equipped
aircraft to takeoff in low
visibility conditions. Due to
onboard avionics the aircraft
will be less dependent on
ground based infrastructure at
the airport while conducting
take-off operations.
Currently, visibility minimums
for takeoff are dependent on
aircraft equipment, ground
infrastructure, and runway
marking and lighting. This
ensures that pilots are able to
visually maintain the runway
centerline during both nominal
and aborted takeoffs. By using
cockpit-based technologies
such as HUD, EFVS, SVS or
other advanced vision system
technologies, the pilot will be
able to maintain an equivalent
awareness of runway
centerline with reduced
dependence on airport

3, S

115

*Increased
Access

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

Navigation

infrastructure when visual
conditions are below those
normally required for takeoff.

Provides
course
and
altitude
guidance
to
touchdo
wn as
well as
runway
situation
al
awarene
ss
389

Low
Visibility/Ceili
ng Landing
Operations

2

2

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent. Not
supported
if ILS is
not
available.

3, S

116

The ability to land in low
visibility/ceiling conditions is
improved for aircraft equipped
with some combination of
navigation derived from
augmented GNSS or ILS and
other cockpit-based
technologies or combinations
of cockpit-based technologies
and ground infrastructure.The
ability to land in low
visibility/ceiling conditions is
improved for aircraft equipped
with some combination of
navigation derived from
augmented GNSS or ILS, and
Head-up Display (HUD), EFVS,
SVS, advanced vision system
and other cockpit-based
technologies that combine to
improve human
performance. Cockpit-based
technologies allow instrument
approach procedure access
with reduced requirements on
ground-based navigation and
airport infrastructure. Due to
onboard avionics airport
access is maintained in low
visibility/ceiling conditions.

*Increased
Safety*Increas
ed Access

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

Navigation

Provides
position
for
RNP/RN
AV SIDS
to
enable
aircraft
to avoid
hazards.

390

2

2

Provides
postion
to ADS-B
for use
at
airports
without
ground
based
surveilan
ce
409

x

2

2

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent

APNT
CONOPs
only
supports
135
busiest
airports,
RADAR
like
coverage
not
available
below
5000'AGL

Low
Visibility/Ceili
ng Departure
Operations

Leverages augmented GNSS
capabilities to allow
appropriately equipped
aircraft to depart in low
visibility conditions. Due to
onboard avionics the aircraft
will be able to depart in low
visibility conditions using
RNAV/RNP SIDs, EFVS, SVS, or
advanced vision systems.

*Increased
access
*Enhanced
Safety

Increase
Flexibility
in the
Terminal
Environm
ent

Navigation

Remotely
Staffed Tower
Services

Remotely Staffed Towers
provide ATM services for
operations into and out of
designated airports without
physically constructing,
equipping, and/or sustaining
tower facilities at these
airports. Instead of out-thewindow visual surveillance,
controllers maintain
situational awareness provided
by surface surveillance
displayed on an ANSP display
system and a suite of decision
support tools using aircraftderived data.

*Increased
airport
capacity in
low visibility
and night
conditions
*Improvemen
t in runway
incursion
alerting
*Improvemen
t in availability
and
performance
of ATM
services at
airports
*Reduced cost
of sustaining,
expanding,
and improving
ATM services
at airports

Transform
Facilities

Infrastructu
reInformation
Manageme
nt Service

3

3, S
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6005

6022

Provides
navigati
on
capabilit
y to
remain
on
planned
optimize
d route
to
reduce
emission
s, fuel
burn and
noise
Provides
navigati
on
capabilit
y to
remain
on
planned
optimize
d route
to
reduce
emission
s, fuel
burn and
noise

2

2

2

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent.
Negated if
ILS is not
optimal
approach.

2

RNP .3
not
sufficient
to
maintain
2025
capacity
in
Terminal
Environm
ent.
Negated if
ILS is not
optimal
approach.

All

All

Environmenta
lly & Energy
Favorable Air
Traffic
Management
Concepts and
Gate-to-Gate
Operational
Procedures Phase II

Explore, develop,
demonstrate, evaluate and
support the implementation
and deployment of Air Traffic
Management and gate-to-gate
operational changes to the
NAS that have the potential to
reduce the environmental
impacts of aviation support
mobility growth by increasing
the capacity and throughput of
the NAS. It will include
multiple increments delivered
over time.

No Benefits
Provided

Increase
Safety,
Security,
and
Environm
ental
Performa
nce

Infrastructu
reInformation
Manageme
nt Service

Environmenta
lly & Energy
Favorable Air
Traffic
Management
Concepts and
Gate-to-Gate
Operational
Procedures Phase III

Explore, develop,
demonstrate, evaluate and
support the implementation
and deployment of Air Traffic
Management and gate-to-gate
operational changes to the
NAS that have the potential to
reduce the environmental
impacts of aviation support
mobility growth by increasing
the capacity and throughput of
the NAS. It will include
multiple increments delivered
over time.

No Benefit
Provided

Increase
Safety,
Security,
and
Environm
ental
Performa
nce

Infrastructu
reInformation
Manageme
nt Service
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Provides
postion
to ADS-B
for
separati
on as
well as
continuo
us
updates
to INS
and
other
navigati
on

Oceanic Intrail Climb and
Descent

2

1

Solution
alternativ
es do not
support
Oceanic
service

1
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ANSP automation
enhancements will take
advantage of improved
communication, navigation,
and surveillance coverage in
the oceanic domain. When
authorized by the controller,
pilots of equipped aircraft use
established procedures for
climbs and descents.
Improved ANSP automation
provides the opportunity to
use new procedures and
reduce longitudinal spacing for
the duration of the procedure.
Aircraft are able to fly the
most advantageous
trajectories with climb and
descent maneuvers.

Improved
efficiency
Increased
capacity
Reduced fuel
burn and
engine
emissions

Initiate
Trajectory
Based
Operation
s

ATCSeparation
Assurance

C. Glossary of Acronyms
3D RMS:
4DT:
ADS-B:
ADS-R:
AGL:
ANSP:
APNT:
ARNS:
ATC:
ATCRBS:
CDMA:
CFR:
CONOPS:
CONUS:
CPFSK:
DLL:
DME:
DOP:
DS-BPSK:
FAA:
FCC:
FIS-B:
GBT:
GNSS:
GPS:
HPE:
ICAO:
ICD:
IFR:
ILS:
IMC:
JPDO:
JTIDS:
MLAT:
MSO:
NAC:
NACp:
NAS:
Next Gen:
OI:
OV:
PDOP:

Three Dimensional Root Mean Squared
Four Dimensional Trajectory
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Re-broadcast
Above Ground Level
Air Navigation Service Provider
Alternate Precision Navigation and Timing
Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service
Air Traffic Control
Air TrafficControl RADAR Broadcast Service
Code Division Multiple Access
Code of Federal Regulations
Concept of Operations
Continental United States
Continuous Phase, Frequency Shift Keying
Delay Lock Loop
Distance Measuring Equipment
Dilution of Precision
Direct Sequence – Bi-phase Shift Keying
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Flight Information Service - Broadcast
Ground Based Transmitter
Global Navigation Satellite System
Global Positioning System
Horizontal Position Error
International Civil Aviation Organization
Interface Control Document
Instrument Flight Rules
Instrument Landing System
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Joint Planning Development Office
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
Multi-Lateration
Message Start Opportunity
Navigational Accuracy Code
Navigational Accuracy Code for Position
National Airspace
Next Generation Airspace
Operational Improvement
Operational View
Positional Dilution of Precision
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PRN:
RAIM:
RNAV:
RNP:
SA:
SSA:
SV:
TACAN:
TBO:
TDMA:
TIS-B:
UAT:
UHARS:
URE:
VOR:
VOR MON:
WAAS:

Pseudo Random Noise
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
Area Navigation
Required Navigation Performance
Situational Awareness
Shared Situational Awareness
System View
Tactical Aerial Navigation
Trajectory Based Operations
Time Division Multiple Access
Traffic Information Service - Broadcast
Universal Access Transceiver
Ultra High Accuracy Reference System
User Range Error
VHF Omnidirectional Ranging
VOR Minimum Operating Network
Wide Area Augmentation System
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